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1. Introduction 
1.1 Overcoming the policy ‘implementation gap’ to improve care coordination  
The rising prevalence of chronic conditions – diabetes, dementia, cardiovascular 
disease, asthma and many others, including the problem of multi-morbidity – creates 
substantial challenges for health systems worldwide. In Austria, apparent deficits in the 
quality of care for people with chronic conditions are increasingly recognized as 
undermining the performance of the health system. For example, OECD figures suggest 
a high level of avoidable hospital admissions for people with chronic conditions; 
uncontrolled hospital admissions for diabetes in Austria are the highest in the OECD at 
about 188 per 100,000 population (OECD average: 50 per 100,000 population),
1
 while 
admissions for acute exacerbations of respiratory conditions are also higher in Austria 
than in other countries (OECD, 2011). In the case of diabetes, a recent study suggests 
that blood glucose and lipid levels, hypertension and related cardiovascular risk factors 
are poorly controlled in about 50 per cent of diabetics, and more than 20 per cent suffer 
from at least one severe complication such as blindness, major and minor amputations, 
end-stage renal failure, myocardial infarction or stroke (Rakovac et al., 2009). 
In many countries, the organisation and financing of health care are oriented towards 
treating acute short-term illness. As a result, health systems are often characterised by 
fragmented delivery structures. The acute model of care is widely recognized as ill-
suited to meeting the health needs of people with chronic conditions, who require 
seamless care over extended periods of time and across multiple sectors and settings of 
care. Achieving better coordination and integration of care has therefore become a 
focus for health care reform in many countries. Better care coordination may not 
necessarily save costs in the short term, but it is likely to enhance the overall efficiency 
of the health system through improved outcomes and this can prevent wasteful 
spending in the long term (Suhrcke et al., 2008). Integrated care has thus become an 
explicit objective of health system reform in many countries (McKee & Nolte, 2009). 
                                                                    
1
 The indicator refers to the number of hospital discharges of people aged 15 years and over with 
diabetes Type I or II without mention of a short-term or long-term complication per 100 000 population. 
Rates have been adjusted for differences in the age and sex structure of each country‟s population. 
Variations in coding practices and disease classification systems between countries may to some extent 
affect the comparability of data.  
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Although there is substantial consensus on the need for better coordination of care, 
little is known about how best to implement policies to achieve this aim. The notion of 
a „gap‟ between policy vision and actual implementation has been a long-standing topic 
in public administration and management (Hjern & Porter, 1981) and the problem is 
not unique to health care: indeed, in education, labour market and other public policy 
domains, policy-makers are increasingly grappling not only with the problem of 
“where to go” but also of “how to get there” (OECD, 2010). Implementing health 
policy tends to be particularly challenging. Hurdles include organisational complexity; 
multiple agency relationships between payer and provider, provider and patient, and 
patient and payer; and often diverging interests between policy-makers and regulators 
on the one hand, and payers, providers and patients on the other. 
Health care reforms in Austria in 2005 introduced two key policy instruments to 
improve care coordination for people with chronic conditions: a Reformpool of virtual 
funding intended to address the divide between inpatient and outpatient care via 
projects jointly financed by social health insurance (SHI) and State governments, and 
disease management programmes (DMPs) to improve care coordination specifically for 
people with chronic conditions. The adoption of these and other measures was seen as a 
significant step toward reducing fragmentation in health care delivery. However, the 
results of these reforms have fallen short of policy makers‟ expectations. In 2012, only 
32,000 patients and fewer than 1000 physicians participated in the DMP Therapie 
Aktiv introduced in six of Austria‟s nine Federal States. With regard to the 
Reformpool, on average only 15.8 percent of (theoretically) available funds have been 
used, with regional variations ranging from 1.5 percent (Tyrol) to 33 percent (Styria). 
In the eyes of Austrian stakeholders, the initial momentum of reform implementation 
has slowed. 
How best to bridge the gap between policy vision and practice is a critical question for 
policy makers in Austria and elsewhere, particularly as the prevalence of chronic 
conditions continues to grow (Gress et al., 2009). In this report we provide cross-
national comparative analysis with the aim of giving policy makers in Austria a better 
understanding of their own situation and insights from the experience of other countries 
facing similar challenges. 
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1.2 Study objectives 
The overarching motivation for this study is to better understand major factors which 
may impede or support key elements in reform processes intended to achieve better 
care coordination. Specific objectives are to: 
 identify barriers to the implementation of care coordination policies in Austria; 
 compare the experience of policy implementation in Austria and Germany and 
identify insights for Austria; 
 discuss options for action in Austria. 
 
1.3 Structure of this report 
Section 2 outlines a conceptual framework for analysis by distinguishing key 
dimensions and meanings of integration, defining indicators of policy success, and 
outlining an explanatory theory to help those responsible for policy development and 
implementation better understand the reasons for policy outcomes. 
Section 3 explains the comparative case study design, and the methods used for data 
collection and analysis. 
Section 4 summarises the main challenges to care coordination in Austria and 
Germany. The Section illustrates key policy drivers, describes attempts to overcome 
fragmentation of care, and examines policy outcomes based on the conceptual 
framework. 
Section 5 explores implementation barriers and levers based on the cross-country 
comparative analysis of Austria and Germany. 
Section 6 draws conclusions based on the analyses. 
Section 7 offers recommendations to strengthen the implementation of care 
coordination policies in Austria. 
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2. Framework for analysis 
2.1 Categorising policies to improve care coordination 
Over the past decade, concepts such as „integrated care‟ and „care coordination‟ have 
become buzzwords in health policy debates, but are frequently used inconsistently 
(Kodner & Spreeuwenberg, 2002). Analysts have attempted to develop a common 
terminology to enable systematic assessment of the structures and processes involved in 
achieving integrated care in practice, their prerequisites and their effects on health care 
delivery and user outcomes. The most frequently used taxonomies differentiate 
between type, degree and breadth of integration (table 1). 
As regards types of integration, the clinical integration of services across providers and 
over time should clearly form the basis of any care coordination initiative. However, 
the other types highlighted in table 1 point out the need to consider how this clinical 
integration will be organised. In other words, it will be important to reflect on whether 
the necessary financial, informational, administrative, organisational and normative 
levers are in place to support the process of clinical integration. 
Leutz‟ notion of a continuum from full separation over linkage, coordination to full 
integration illustrates different degrees of integration. Full integration of clinical and 
financial arrangements is sometimes seen as the „ideal vision‟ of integrated care, 
because this model is most likely to maximise the shared (clinical and financial) 
interest of providers to provide care efficiently, where efficiency is defined as the 
relation between outcomes achieved over resources invested. However, in order to 
function optimally, the other types of integration also need to be addressed. In some 
respects, the continuum of integration may be understood as a sequence. In most health 
systems with fragmented financing and delivery structures, it may be politically and 
technically impossible to move from full separation to full integration. In between these 
two extremes, however, countries will have a range of reform options to improve 
linkage and coordination between care providers. As fully integrated care in the sense 
of Leutz‟ framework can be seen as a long-term vision in many countries, in this report 
we mainly refer to efforts to enhance „care coordination‟ as the more short- to medium-
term objective. However, we also acknowledge that these concepts will be overlapping 
in practice. 
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The breadth of integration is another key dimension in analysing care coordination and 
integration. Policy-makers can choose models focused on a single indication such as 
diabetes. Although single-indication models such as disease management programmes 
may be composed of multiple complex components including self-management 
support, clinical management and monitoring interventions, they tend to remain 
relatively narrow in scope as regards for instance patients with complex multi-
morbidities or a whole-population focus where intervention does not occur only once 
patients have developed symptoms (secondary prevention, as in disease management 
programmes) but ideally much earlier in disease aetiology by targeting otherwise 
healthy people with risk factors for a disease (primary prevention). These aspects may 
be addressed in more patient-centred and population-oriented models of integration, 
respectively. 
The answer to the question “which model is best” should be driven by the needs of the 
population addressed. For patients with a single condition, a classic disease 
management programme may be sufficient. For more complex patients with multiple 
medical and social care needs, in contrast, additional tailored case management may be 
required. Population-oriented models of care, in turn, may incorporate indication- and 
patient-centred models. The vision in these models relates to optimising care delivery 
in light of the needs of a local community and taking into account the existing 
distribution and quality of supply structures. 
 
2.2 Assessing policy outcomes 
At a health system level, multiple dimensions may be distinguished in assessing 
success and failure of policy implementation. Precise definitions of „success‟ and 
„failure‟ will depend on the extent to which the policy‟s initial objectives have been 
met. Generic parameters used in this study include: 
 Awareness and uptake of the policy among the implementers of policy, in terms 
of payers engaged in funding projects, participation of eligible providers and 
patients;  
 Availability of evaluations suggesting improved care quality and outcomes.  
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Clearly, high participation (DMP enrolment) rates are not the ultimate aim of a policy. 
The ultimate goal is to improve patient health outcomes (morbidity, mortality, quality 
of life). However, DMPs and other policies were introduced based on the assumption 
that better care structures would improve care processes (eg adherence to treatment 
guidelines and agreements to exchange information, use of information systems to 
ensure continuity of patient data over time and across providers) and ultimately health 
outcomes. According to this logic, high participation rates of payers, providers and 
patients can be seen as a necessary pre-condition to achieve large-scale population 
health impact. The above indicators of success are thus to be understood in the sense 
that the policy is sufficiently known and accepted, has been taken up, evaluated and 
embedded into medical practice. 
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Table 1: Integration: types, degrees and breadth  
Types of integration  
 clinical: the extent to which services are coordinated 
- over time;  
- across disciplines and/ or sectors of a health system;  
- across the entire continuum of care (prevention, primary and specialist care, rehabilitation and 
social care).  
 financial: the extent to which financial flows are aligned with the delivery pathway across providers 
 informational: the extent to which clinical and managerial information systems support 
communication between clinical teams, outcome measurement and performance management  
 administrative: non-clinical support structures (such as strategic planning and shared human 
resource management and seconded staff) eg to support coordination between small practices 
 organizational: governance and organisational arrangements (such as the creation of networks, 
mergers, contracting or strategic alliances) are used to aid integration within and between health care 
institutions 
 normative: the extent to which a shared vision is identified, communicated and operationalized 
across individuals and organisations  
Degrees of integration 
 full integration: the integrated organisation is responsible for the full continuum of care, including 
financing. Multidisciplinary teams manage care in all key settings, using a common record as part of 
daily joint practice. Funds are pooled to purchase new or existing services and align financial 
incentives. 
 coordination: organisations retain their own service responsibility and funding criteria, but smooth 
transitions between settings. For example, providers define and routinely provide information in 
both directions, screen patients at key points (eg hospital discharge) to identify special needs, and 
use some financial incentives. 
 linkage: organisations understand delivery and payment arrangements for each service and respond 
to special needs of patients through appropriate referral and follow-up. Organisations provide and 
request information (eg discharge information) when needed. 
 full separation: different providers are organisationally and financially isolated. 
Breadth of integration  
 indication-oriented models which integrate care for a single indication (eg disease management for 
diabetes 
 patient-centred models which focus on the potentially multiple needs of the user/ patient (eg case 
management for patients with multi-morbidity or for end-of-life care, discharge management 
 regional/ population-oriented models which focus on the entire population of insurees and 
continuum of care, including strategies for prevention and health promotion, case-finding and 
diagnosis tailored to the needs of a local community. These models may comprise indication- and/or 
patient-oriented integrated care. 
 
Sources: adapted from (Amelung et al., 2009; Delnoij et al., 2002; Fulop et al., 2005; Leutz, 1999; Nolte 
& McKee, 2008; Peek et al., 2009; Rosen et al., 2011; Shortell et al., 1994). 
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2.3 Conceptualizing policy implementation  
The implementation of public policy has stimulated a wide array of theoretical 
frameworks (for overviews see eg Hill (2009); Sabatier (1999; 1980)). In health policy, 
the multiplicity of actors and in particular the tripartite structure of different groups of 
payers, providers and patients, who are supposed to implement a policy, increases 
complexity. The role of these stakeholder groups differs between health systems, 
raising additional questions over the role of context in shaping health policy. In 
recognition of this complexity, the policy triangle developed by Walt and Gilson (1994) 
provides a useful starting point for analysis. The framework is grounded in a political 
economy perspective and emphasises the importance of and interaction between 
context, actors and process in shaping health policy design (content) and outcomes. 
Thereby, the framework may help to explain why intended policy outcomes manifest or 
fail to emerge (Figure 1). 
The health system context may be conceptualized in terms of four core functions of 
health systems such as governance, financing, resource generation and service delivery 
(WHO, 2000). In particular, this includes the ways in which financing (collection, 
pooling, allocation of resources and provider payment), health care delivery and human 
resources are organised across sectors, and what, if any, issues concern the interfaces 
between sectors. Governance can be understood as translating expectations towards 
health services into strategic planning decisions. These may be concerned with 
questions of user choice and empowerment, quality monitoring and measurement, 
clinical guidelines and standardisation in medical care, as indications of a wider trend 
away from delivering patient care based on professional discretion towards a more 
transparently managed care process where multiple disciplines co-operate based on 
evidence-based guidance (Scott et al., 2000). 
The process of health reform may be broken down into four functional elements 
(OECD, 2010). The first element is an evaluation of health system performance, in the 
sense of formal or informal identification of problems in the health system (policy 
drivers). The second element refers to the stage where ideas emerge on how to address 
the recognized problems. Following an „ideal‟ model of policy-making, alternative 
courses of action will be identified and their respective costs and benefits will be 
evaluated (policy design). The third element refers to the selection of a particular 
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course of action (policy adoption) eg through legislation. The fourth stage considers the 
implementation of the policy, in particular the incentives that might be needed to 
motivate stakeholders to take up the policy. Such incentives may broadly be classified 
as market or economic means (exchange relationships between providers and/or payers 
such as financial and non-financial incentives), hierarchical instruments (rules and 
regulations such as practice guidelines and standards for information exchange), or 
network mechanisms (the formation and sustenance of trust relationships between 
actors) (Thompson et al., 1991). 
Given the key role of stakeholders in shaping policy outcomes, the following analysis 
will particularly focus on the characteristics of different actors involved in policy 
implementation, in relation to context factors described above. An approach to do this 
is to conceptualize actors‟ behaviours through the lens of contextual interaction theory 
(Bressers & Klok, 1988; O'Toole, 2004). The perspective is, essentially, a social 
process theory that places emphasis on interdependent action between actors involved 
in policy implementation over time in a particular context. The theory‟s logic 
incorporates three sets of actor characteristics: their motivation, information, and 
power. In this report we understand these characteristics as follows: 
 Motivation refers to incentives and values affecting the goals and behaviour of 
stakeholders; 
 Information refers to technical knowledge at hand but also its interpretation with 
regard to available options for action and their desirability; 
 Power is here understood in terms of actors' resources and capacity to impede or 
facilitate policy implementation. Thus, in line with Berger (2005), „power‟ refers 
not only to an actor‟s power over key veto points (see also Immergut (1992)) but 
also to the power to act because the necessary (staff, management, logistic etc.) 
capacity is available. “Power with” refers to stakeholders‟ skills to negotiate with 
others and reach agreements on how to move forward. 
The analysis will focus on broad groups of payers, patients, providers and their 
representatives as the key actors, because these represent the major interest groups 
affecting health care policy implementation in Austria and Germany. Clearly, there 
may also be variation not only between but also within these groups. Depending on 
how key influencing factors combine, one could expect different kinds of 
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implementation processes and outcomes. The analysis can thus help implementation 
managers to identify strategic strengths and weaknesses that arise from actors‟ 
characteristics and their interaction in a particular context. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
 
Source: adapted by authors from OECD (2010); Walt and Gilson (1994). 
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3. Research methods 
3.1 Comparative case study design 
A comparative case study design (Yin, 1994, 2003) is used to explore drivers of policy 
outcomes. The rationale for a comparative lens is to help examine factors that may have 
been decisive for past policy „failures‟ and „successes‟, as opposed to those that were 
simply present. One approach to do this is to look for different outcomes elsewhere 
despite similar starting points, and to identify whether key factors were configured 
differently (Marmor, 2012; Marmor et al., 2005). 
In this report, we compare the Austrian case to Germany, a country that seems to have 
experienced relative „success‟ in implementing policies similar to those introduced in 
Austria. Another key reason for selecting Germany as a primary comparator is that 
there are structural similarities between the German and Austrian health systems, which 
are likely to pose comparable challenges and starting points in launching policies to 
improve the coordination of chronic care delivery (see Section 4.1).  
The units of analysis in this research are the selected policies described in Section 4.2, 
but we also compare at the level of the country. While we are interested in the general 
idea of how to successfully promote care integration, these specific policy initiatives 
have been chosen because they were introduced with high expectations on the side of 
policy-makers which have not always been met in practice, and thus these policies are 
particularly illustrative of barriers in the care coordination policy „implementation gap‟. 
The selected policies also illustrate two key different levels of implementation at a 
strategic project development level affecting mainly payers and providers, and at a 
project level affecting mainly individual practitioners and patients. 
Cross-national inquiry will not solve the problems for policy-makers, and should avoid 
“naïve transplantation” of policies from other systems without any adaptation (Klein, 
2009). But comparative analysis can help national policy-makers to better understand 
their own situation and to get insights and ideas from countries who are grappling with 
similar challenges. Thereby, cross-national analysis is intended to stimulate learning 
and dialogue between different stakeholders through a better understanding of a 
country‟s policy issues and options for action. 
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3.2 Data collection 
The study draws on two main methods for data collection. First, the academic and grey 
literature in English and German on integrated care developments in Austria and 
Germany was reviewed using scientific and popular data bases such as 
PubMed/Medline, Web of Science, EconLit, Google Scholar and Google. Second, 
primary data was collected through interviews with stakeholders involved in the design 
and implementation of care coordination reforms in Austria and Germany. The 
interviews mainly serve to elicit key stakeholders' experiences of the reform processes, 
and perceived causal inferences about barriers and enabling factors. They also serve to 
probe themes emerging from the literature and fill gaps not addressed by existing 
research.  
For the selection of interviewees, purposeful sampling based on maximum variation 
sampling (Patton, 1990) was used. The purpose was to represent the diversity of 
relevant stakeholder groups acting at different levels of the health care system (table 2), 
in order to gain an understanding of the range of stakeholder perspectives on the topic. 
The sample size was therefore informed by the stakeholder groups we intended to 
interview and not to achieve data saturation. Individual interviewees were identified 
through web search and word of mouth based on their relevant roles and functions. The 
recruitment of interview partners was conducted by IHS (for Austria) and LSE (for 
Germany).  
To ensure consistency in data collection across the interviewees and across countries a 
semi-structured interview guide was developed. The guide was pre-tested among 
members of the research team and iteratively refined during data collection to improve 
comprehensibility and focus of the interview questions. The interviews were semi-
structured in the sense that a comparable interview guide was used for all interviews in 
Austria and Germany, but that specific questions asked were adapted to the interviewee 
in question. For instance, additional questions could be asked to follow-up novel 
themes and ideas (Robson, 2011). 
In total, 15 interviews with Austrian stakeholders and 27 interviews with German 
stakeholders were conducted (table 2). All participants were informed about the 
objectives of the project, and were encouraged to ask questions at any point before, 
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during or after the interview. Participants were assured that any contributions would be 
anonymous. The interviews were conducted in German and transcribed verbatim. The 
interviews were analysed in German in order to maintain linguistic nuances, and 
emerging themes were then translated into English.  
The London School of Economics and Political Science Research Ethics Committee 
passed the research proposal under Chair's Action, as no major ethical issues were 
identified. 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of interviewees  
Interviewees’ roles and 
characteristics  
Germany Austria Total 
Ministry and regulatory 
bodies 
3 1 4 
Payers 4 4 8 
Providers  3 2 5 
Associations in 
charge of planning 
and contracting 
1 1 2 
Professional 
societies 
2 1 3 
Representatives from 
local physician-hospital 
networks (Germany 
only) 
8 - 8 
Patient representatives 2 2 4 
Supervisory authorities 
and boards 
3 2 5 
Health system experts 
and policy advisors 
4 4 8 
Total 27 15 42 
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3.3 Data analysis 
The transcripts were analysed using a hybrid approach to thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 
1998; Fereday & Cochrane, 2006). Within a deductive frame of theory-informed 
categories and constructs relating to contextual interaction theory (“motivation”, 
“information”, “power”), themes were developed inductively from the data based on 
careful and iterative reading of the interview transcripts. A close connection between 
data and conceptualization was achieved through a systematic, iterative process that 
involved assigning labels and indexing from interview transcripts („coding‟) and 
comparing emergent themes with other pieces of data.  
In identifying themes, the coding strategy was oriented along Ryan and Bernard‟s 
(2003) recommendations, which, among others involve examining similarities and 
differences between stakeholder groups and between countries, such as exploring how 
interviewees discuss a topic and perceive causal relationships, but also reflecting on 
what interviewees might omit in their answers. 
The analysis was grounded in two levels. First, a „within-country‟ analysis was 
conducted for Austria (by IHS) and for Germany (by LSE). For each interview 
transcript, text passages were involved with each other to identify emerging themes. 
Subsequently, themes arising from different stakeholders were compared and 
contrasted. Based on the two country case studies, a „cross-country analysis‟ was 
conducted jointly by LSE and IHS. Key implementation barriers and levers were 
systematically compared for both countries, guided by the conceptual framework. 
The qualitative computer-based analysis software Atlas.ti was used to facilitate data 
management, support the coding process and increase transparency of the results. The 
research teams at LSE and IHS had regular discussions on emerging themes within the 
interviews and to adjust questions in future interviews. A sample of coded transcripts 
was exchanged to foster comparability of coding strategies. Findings from the 
interviews were cross-checked and triangulated with media reports, academic and grey 
literature (where available) to improve robustness of the findings and examine 
competing explanations. 
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4. Policies to improve care coordination  
4.1 Policy drivers  
Efforts to improve the coordination and integration of care result from and are 
embedded in a particular health system context. During the interviews, stakeholders in 
Austria and Germany were therefore also asked about their assessment of key context 
factors that, first, help explain why there is a perceived need for better coordination of 
care and, second, also impede progress from a contextual perspective. Challenges to 
care coordination were identified in the following areas: financing, organisation and 
governance. 
Financing 
In both Austria and Germany, sectorally fragmented financing (ambulatory, hospital, 
long-term care) reduces payers‟ interest in cross-sectoral integration, as benefits are 
perceived to accrue elsewhere. In Austria, hospitals are paid via the provincial health 
funds financed by all levels of government and SHI, while office-based physicians are 
paid by SHI through a mix of flat fees per visit and fee-for-service. As neither the state 
health funds nor sickness funds are fully responsible for the interfaces between 
inpatient and outpatient care, financial issues arise. In Germany, SHI pays for operating 
expenses both for hospitals and office-based physicians, but budgets for both sectors 
are largely separate. Payment for office-based physicians is capped through a global 
sum at regional KV
2
 level. Payment for individual physicians is based on the number of 
patients of the previous year‟s quarter multiplied by a specialty-specific case value 
(since 2009) plus optional payment for certain extra-budgetary services. The lack of a 
shared financial responsibility for outpatient and hospital services means that 
investments eg in ambulatory care may not pay off to sickness funds. Reduced hospital 
admissions for one condition are also suspected to trigger substitutive activity in other 
areas by hospitals to compensate for expenditure foregone, thus not reducing overall 
expenditure on hospital care.  
                                                                    
2
 The Regional Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians (Kassenärztliche Vereinigungen). 
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Organisation 
Service delivery is organised based on the patient‟s direct access to both generalist and 
specialist physicians in the outpatient sector in both Austria and Germany. Interviewees 
repeatedly point out that relationships between providers tend to function rather 
„randomly‟, as mutual roles and responsibilities are not well defined. For instance, what 
specific duties a “Hausarzt” ought to fulfil, such as when to refer to other levels of care 
or how to communicate with other providers in a timely manner, remains dependent on 
the goodwill of local individuals and not on binding commitment, resulting in large-
scale orientation problems. Solo practices are the predominant mode of service delivery 
in the outpatient sector. In Germany, about 38.8 per cent of generalists work in small 
group practices (“Gemeinschaftspraxen”) in 2011 (KBV, 2011c); sharing office space 
but not necessarily patients or patients‟ records. In Austria, it is estimated that less than 
1 per cent of generalists work in small group practices (“Gruppenpraxen”). 
Governance  
The health systems in Austria and Germany are marked by the central role of self-
governance actors, where the Ministry of Health sets the overall regulatory framework, 
but payers and providers are, through their representation in statutory bodies, in charge 
of the detailed implementation of public law. A part of governance is setting standards 
and then monitoring and ensuring adherence to standards based on performance 
information and evaluation. The recognition that these dimensions of governance were 
not sufficiently developed was a key driver for the introduction of care coordination 
policies in Germany and Austria. 
The shift towards better care coordination entails efforts to move beyond the 
professional judgement of individual doctors towards shared responsibility for the care 
process. Transparency based on scientific standards and evidence-based guidelines 
therefore form the backbone of a DMP and other care coordination policies. However, 
the extent of guideline adherence among physicians is not evaluated in Austria and 
Germany. While in both countries, measures have been taken over the past years to 
promote quality monitoring in the inpatient sector, in the outpatient sector quality 
monitoring and assessment for office-based physicians remains less developed. 
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Especially in the outpatient sector there is little culture of monitoring, understanding 
and improvement on treatment errors. Some providers may be afraid of a ranking and 
public disclosure of their performance.  
To ensure that evidence-based medicine is actually “lived” in practice, some form of 
(electronic) data exchange will be a prerequisite. Currently in Austria and Germany, 
information deficits arise at the interfaces of care. While individual providers 
(hospitals, groups of physicians or single practices) have internal information systems, 
problems eg regarding patients‟ medical history and prescriptions arise especially in 
cross-sectoral communication. In Austria, the planned electronic health record ELGA 
and ePrescription could help address some of the technical barriers, but these systems 
have not been introduced yet and their acceptance in practice remains unclear. Socio-
technical concerns over data privacy, such as how to safeguard sensitive medical data, 
are also frequently mentioned by Austrian interviewees, including fears of “patients 
made of glass”.  
In Germany, electronic health records that would enable monitoring patient pathways 
across sectors and over time exist only sporadically, mostly in the initiative of 
individual hospitals or physician networks. However, compatibility among different 
outpatient software systems and inconsistent documentation practices among providers 
remain significant problems. The partial introduction of an electronic health insurance 
card (eCard) in late 2011, for about ten per cent of the insured, contains only 
administrative data so far, but patients may on a voluntary basis also add some medical 
data eg on allergies and drug incompatibilities (Gematik, 2011). Unlike electronic 
medical records, privacy would be more straightforward as patients retain the 
ownership of their data. However, in field trials the eCard has proved impractical eg 
due to the need for the patient to type in a 12-digit ID number. Nevertheless, the Health 
Care Structure Act of 2012 provides that sickness funds who fail to provide 70 per cent 
of their insured with the eCard until 31 December 2012 may not increase their 
administrative expenses in 2013 compared to 2012 (SGB V, § 4.6). 
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4.2 Policy design 
Austria and Germany have introduced a series of reforms to improve the coordination 
and integration of care over the past years. Two key measures were the introduction of 
disease management programmes (DMPs) in both countries to improve care 
coordination at a doctor-patient level, and measures to encourage local experimentation 
and innovation with cross-sectoral models of care via integrated care contracting in 
Germany and a Reformpool in Austria. What underlines the importance of freedom of 
choice in both countries is that participation is voluntary for payers, providers and 
patients.
3
 Comparing these four policy initiatives illustrates key differences in 
approaches to policy design and implementation. 
Encouraging local innovation in cross-sectoral initiatives via the Reformpool (AT) 
and integrated care contracts (DE) 
Starting points were similar in both countries: the perceived substantial fragmentation 
in financing and delivery between ambulatory (office-based physician) and hospital 
sectors. The Reformpool in Austria was specifically introduced to fund innovative 
projects that shift service provision between the in- and outpatient sector in ways that 
benefit both state governments and sickness funds, by ensuring that care is delivered in 
the optimal setting (Czypionka & Röhrling, 2009). In Germany, integrated care 
contracting (§ 140 SGB V) was introduced in 2000. Policy objectives were to 
overcome sectoral divides by encouraging local experimentation via direct contracts 
between sickness funds and providers. 
In both countries, no additional funds were put into the health system to finance 
integrated care. Novel forms of care have to be funded via re-distribution of resources, 
but who gains and who loses in this re-distributive process differs between the 
countries. In Germany, integrated care contracting had hardly been taken up in the 
initial years since 2000. Therefore, between 2004 and 2008 the “start-up funding” 
framework was introduced to enable sickness funds to withhold 1 per cent of total 
hospital and SHI physician remuneration to finance cross-sectoral or interdisciplinary 
                                                                    
3
 Both in Austria and in Germany, patients are by default in “standard care”. Participation in a DMP or 
other novel care programme thus requires an active choice and confirmation of enrolment in such a 
programme. This seeks to ensure informed consent, stimulate patient‟s active involvement in the care 
process, and to know the number and characteristics of programme participants. 
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projects (SVR, 2010). Thus, payers had access to earmarked and (from their 
perspective) additional funds, at the expense of the totality of SHI providers. Since 
2009, sickness funds are legally required to downwards adjust the global sum paid to 
regional KVs in collective contracts by the service volume delivered in selective 
integrated care contracts (SGB V, § 140d). In Austria, although the formal 
arrangements seem similar – up to 1 per cent (for the years 2005 and 2006) and up to 2 
per cent (for the years 2007 and 2008) of total health care expenditure could be 
reserved for Reformpool projects – the crucial difference to Germany was that these 
funds were not additional, but only virtually available from the payer‟s perspective. 
Actually available funds were only the remainder after existing mandatory 
commitments (eg physician bills, contributions to state hospital funds, prescriptions) 
had been paid. The Reformpool was thus developed within the existing financing 
system, without changing financial incentives in the system (Czypionka & Röhrling, 
2009). 
Pathways to implementation differed in their degree of radicalism. In Germany, 
integrated care contracting was a radically new measure as it enabled individual 
providers or provider networks to contract directly with sickness funds, bypassing the 
collective contracting system that had come to be seen as rigid and discouraging 
innovation. Integrated care contracting was intended to widen the leeway for local 
solutions, and consequently did not impose a central framework. In Austria, in contrast, 
Reformpool projects are required to adhere to collective agreements. If services or 
financial designs differ from collective agreements, the Chamber of Physicians, who is 
in charge of both professional regulation and interest representation in contracting, 
must give consent. 
Disease Management Programmes 
DMPs in Austria and Germany were introduced to improve adherence to clinical 
guidelines and patient self-management in ambulatory care. In Austria, the foundation 
for DMPs has been laid by the 2005 health care reform, to improve the quality of 
chronic care. In Germany, DMPs were introduced in 2002 in response to over-, under- 
and misuse in the German health system addressed by the Advisory Council to the 
Ministry of Health (SVR, 2001). DMPs were also introduced to reduce incentives for 
24 
 
risk selection in a competitive market. DMP enrolment was defined as an additional 
category in the then existing risk structure adjustment (RSA) mechanism in order to 
better compensate sickness funds for the higher financial risks of chronically ill patients 
(Göpffarth, 2007).  
Pathways to implementation were highly centralised in Germany and mainly 
decentralised in Austria. In Germany, national representatives of payers and providers 
jointly define uniform standards for content and evaluation, as mandated by the 
Ministry of Health, in the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA). On this basis, DMPs are 
developed by individual sickness funds at regional level, accredited by the Federal 
Insurance Office, and translated into contracts either with the Regional Associations of 
SHI Physicians (KVs), who are in charge of collective contracting and have mandatory 
membership of SHI physicians in that region, or directly with individual providers, if 
no collective DMP contract exists. In Austria, approaches to DMP development differ 
across Federal States. The most widespread DMP, Therapie Aktiv, which is for diabetes 
mellitus type 2, was developed in 2004 by the Styrian sickness fund and the Institute 
for Biomedicine and Health Science of Johanneum Research on behalf of Austrian SHI 
(Österreichische Sozialversicherung, 2006). The programme was implemented in 2007. 
Based on a template by the Competence Centre for Integrated Care, which is funded by 
SHI institutions to centralise knowledge to advance integrated care, other sickness 
funds have also adopted the programme. 
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4.3 Policy outcomes 
Encouraging local innovation: Reformpool (AT) and integrated care contracts (DE) 
In both countries, the results at a health system level have been mixed. In Germany, 
during the start-up funding period (2004-2008), integrated care contracts increased to 
over 6000 in 2008 (Grothaus, 2009). Most of these contracts were indication-oriented 
packages of care spanning two or three sectors (eg hospital, ambulatory care, 
rehabilitation), in particular for hip and knee replacements. While having potential for 
patient benefit if applied to the right patients, these contracts were also criticized as 
simple volume discounts rather than optimisations of delivery structures. However, in a 
few “islands of excellence” across Germany, integrated care contracting was also used 
by regional physician networks to develop regional population-oriented cross-sectoral 
networks of care. Funds from the 1 per cent budget were invested in structural 
advancement of IT and management capacity, leading to more professional physician-
led organisations who usually assume cross-sectoral financial responsibility to some 
extent, and who seek to shape local care delivery through shared treatment pathways 
and a number of care and case management programmes. Since the expiry of start-up 
funding in late 2009, the total number of currently running contracts is estimated to still 
be around 6,000 contracts (SVR, 2012). However, the development of more ambitious 
population-oriented, cross-sectoral networks is stagnating and remains limited to a few 
successful pioneers that have attracted much attention (Weatherly et al., 2007) but have 
led to little emulation in other regions. 
The Reformpool in Austria showed a hesitant start in the first two years. With 34 
simultaneously running projects, activity peaked in the third quarter of 2008, and has 
slowed down since then. Most projects focus on disease management for diabetes, 
coronary heart diseases or nephrological diseases, stroke units, discharge and case 
management. On average, 15.8 per cent of possible funds have been used for 
Reformpool-investments. However, use of funds among the nine states ranges from 33 
per cent (Styria) to only 1.5 per cent (Tyrol) (Czypionka & Röhrling, 2009). As an 
Austrian stakeholder concludes: 
“The potential has not been released… and now it seems as if they [Reformpool 
activities in Federal states] are falling asleep.” 
26 
 
In Austria, no comprehensive information exists regarding participation of patients, and 
thus the potential for population health impact of Reformpool projects. This is also 
related to the fact that not all projects require patient enrolment, but may instead 
address process redesign (eg improved discharge management). 
In both Austria and Germany, little is known about the health and economic effects of 
integrated care initiatives. In Germany, the lack of transparency about outcomes has 
been even more controversial as public funds from the entire SHI system were re-
directed to a limited number of contracts. Comprehensive evaluations of the health and 
economic effects of integrated care models remain rare. One of the most scientifically 
comprehensive and publicly transparent approaches appears to be the evaluation of the 
population-oriented cross-sectoral network Gesundes Kinzigtal. In this partnership 
between a local physicians‟ network in the South-West of Germany, the management 
company OptiMedis AG and the two sickness funds AOK Baden-Württemberg and 
LKK, the provider organisation accepts long-term economic responsibility for health 
costs across sectors in return for the prospect of shared savings with sickness funds. 
The long-term contract is intended to incentivise and reward investments into better 
managed care eg through a number of disease and case-management programmes, 
wider health promotion interventions, patient pathways and pharmacotherapy 
guidelines (Hildebrandt et al., 2009). Measurement is population-oriented and covers 
outcomes of different medical modules, such as shared decision-making and specific 
care programmes, as well as overall economic success. Improvements are reported both 
for the quality of medical processes and surrogate outcomes, patient satisfaction, and 
economic gains (Hildebrandt et al., 2011). The evaluation strategy is conducted in 
partnership with a number of academic institutions.
4
 
 
 
                                                                    
4
 More information on current evaluation studies and published results is available at: 
http://www.ekiv.org/en/ausschreibungen-evaluationsprojekte.php (last accessed 3 August 2012). 
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Disease Management Programmes  
DMPs in Germany are often praised as a “success story” (Lisac et al., 2008; Stock et 
al., 2010). Over six million patients participate in one or more of six DMPs (for 
diabetes type 1 and 2, coronary heart disease, breast cancer, asthma and COPD) which 
are offered across Germany. In the case of the DMP diabetes type 2, introduced in 
2002/03 as one of the first DMPs, about three million patients participate, which are 
estimated to be about half of all eligible patients with diabetes in Germany. In 2010, 
physician participation rates ranged from just under 60 per cent in Hamburg to almost 
or over 90 per cent in 7 of 17 KV regions (Bayern, Brandenburg, Bremen, Rheinland-
Pfalz, Saarland, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt) (LSE estimate based on (KBV, 2009 2010, 
2010 2011a, b)). In Austria, general practitioners and specialists for internal medicine 
(both contracted and without a contract) are eligible to participate. As of September 
2012, about 15.3 per cent of eligible physicians participate in the DMP Therapie Aktiv, 
ranging from 8.8 per cent of eligible physicians in Vienna to 25 per cent in Upper 
Austria (IHS HealthEcon estimate based on (Ärzteverlagshaus, 2012; Therapie Aktiv, 
2012)).  
In Austria, interviewees mention that already starting DMPs is a big step forward to 
introduce ideas of evidence-based medicine and reduction of unwarranted practice 
variations. A DMP for Diabetes Mellitus type 2, Therapie Aktiv, is the most widespread 
programme in Austria. It was designed by the Styrian sickness fund in cooperation with 
the Austrian Diabetes Association, and is in part a Reformpool-project or already 
adopted into daily routine in six of nine states. However, based on estimations of about 
420.000 diabetics (Wawrosky, 2010) in Austria, only about 32,000 (about 7.7 per cent) 
are currently participating in Therapie Aktiv (Czypionka et al., 2011). So far, only one 
DMP, Therapie Aktiv for type 2 diabetes, has been implemented in several (six of nine) 
Federal States in Austria. For the development of other DMPs, plans exist but actual 
implementation is slow. 
While in Germany, evaluation of clinical and economic effects is mandatory, the 
robustness of available evaluations remains disputed especially regarding patient-
relevant endpoints (eg mortality, long-term quality of life). In both Austria and 
Germany, transparency for patients on the benefits of DMPs remains in part unclear. 
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In Germany, structural quality has been advanced with better training of medical 
assistants to organise the delivery of DMPs. At a regional level, joint institutions 
between provider and payer representatives provide monitoring and feedback to 
physician practices. Nevertheless, some concerns exist over insufficient quality 
assurance of medical documentation of DMP participants (eg discrepancies between 
documented and billed services where eg a physician registers a patient‟s visit to the 
ophthalmologist but this visit is not billed by the ophthalmologist, potentially because it 
was never provided).  
While the six DMPs have now been successfully embedded into routine care in 
Germany, the Federal Joint Committee, the national body representing SHI payers and 
providers, has decided against the introduction of new DMPs. Priority is now given to 
the better alignment of existing DMPs to multi-morbidity, in order to go beyond the 
disease-specific focus to a more patient-centred model of care. 
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Table 3: Health system context and policy drivers for care coordination in Austria and Germany 
 Austria Germany 
Financing  Hospitals: provincial health funds, funded by all levels of 
government, plus fixed proportion of contributions without 
decision-making role by SHI institutions 
 Office-based SHI physicians: SHI, via collective contracts with 
regional Chambers of Physicians 
 Hospitals: SHI (operating costs), State governments (infrastructure) 
 Office-based SHI physicians: SHI, via collective contracts with Regional 
Associations of SHI physicians (KVs) or selective contracts (since 2000) 
Organisation of care 
delivery 
 No defined roles and duties for communication and cooperation 
between providers 
 Virtually all office-based generalists estimated to work in solo 
practice 
 No defined roles and duties for communication and cooperation between 
providers 
 About 61.2 per cent of office-based generalists work in solo practice 
Governance 
a) Evidence-based 
guidelines 
 
 
b) Information 
systems  
 
 
c) Quality 
monitoring and 
assessment 
 
 Guidelines developed/adapted by medical societies and Arznei und 
Vernunft (a guideline initiative of the Main Association of Austrian 
Social Security Institutions with the pharmaceutical industry); 
adherence not evaluated  
 First Federal Quality Guideline regarding diabetes mellitus type 2 
recommended by MoH based on the DMP Therapie Aktiv 
 Information and communication deficits between hospitals and 
outpatient physicians 
 Electronic health record ELGA in development to incorporate all 
relevant patient data across sectors 
 Local, mostly intra-sectoral information systems 
 Efforts to improve performance evaluation in outpatient sector in 
early stages 
 Some attempts (eg MedTogether, PIK projects) to link services to 
improve care to financial rewards predating DMPs 
 DMP Therapie Aktiv was first large attempt to link services to 
improve care (here: documentation, adherence to guidelines) to 
financial rewards 
 
 Various dispersed guidelines by different medical societies prior to 
DMP, adherence not evaluated 
 Introduction of DMPs prompted physician representatives to start the 
development of more ambitious evidence-based, joint interdisciplinary 
National Care Guidelines 
 Information and communication deficits between hospitals and 
outpatient physicians  
 No nationwide electronic health record; frequently lack of compatibility 
between different IT systems in the outpatient sector  
 Efforts to improve performance evaluation in outpatient sector in early 
stages, but requirement for physicians to have a Quality Management 
(QM) system in their practices 
 Some attempts (eg structural contracts mainly on diabetes concluded by 
regional KVs) predating DMPs 
 DMPs first attempt to link services to improve care (here: 
documentation, adherence to guidelines) to financial rewards at a 
nationwide scale 
Source: Austrian and German case studies; Busse et al (2013), Hofmarcher (2012).  (Busse et al., 2013; 2012)  
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Table 4: Characteristics of selected policies to improve care coordination in Austria and Germany 
 AT: Reformpool (since 2005) DE: Integrated care (since 2000, § 140) AT: DMPs (since 2005) DE: DMPs (since 2002, § 137f-g) 
Target group Payers, Providers Payers, Providers Patients, Providers Patients, Providers 
Breadth of 
integration 
Preferred: cross-sectoral, 
involving hospitals and office-
based physicians 
In practice also indication-
oriented models and non-medical 
projects  
Preferred: cross-sectoral, population-
oriented regional networks 
In practice also interdisciplinary and 
indication-oriented models  
Indication-oriented 
Mostly at ambulatory level 
Indication-oriented 
Mostly at ambulatory level 
Type of 
integration 
Clinical, informational, financial Clinical, informational, financial Clinical, informational Clinical, informational 
Degree of 
integration 
Linkage or coordination Linkage, coordination or integration Coordination or linkage Coordination or linkage 
Incentive design Virtual, non-earmarked funds 
(from payers‟ perspective): 1 
percent (2005/06) and 2 percent 
(2007/08) of total hospital and 
SHI physician remuneration 
theoretically available, but 
practically dependent on level of 
payers‟ budget once mandatory 
commitments have been paid 
Real, earmarked funds (from payers‟ 
perspective): 1 percent 2004-08) of total 
hospital and SHI physician remuneration 
could be withheld by sickness funds to 
finance integrated care contracts 
Since 2009: no earmarked funding, 
downwards adjustment of collective 
contracts legally required 
Payers: no funds 
Providers: flat fee for documentation, 
therapy 
Patients: no financial incentives 
Payers: risk structure adjustment (RSA) 
category (until 2009), administrative flat fee 
(since 2009) 
Providers: flat fee for documentation, therapy 
Patients: financial incentives (eg bonus, lower 
co-payments) 
Pathway for 
implementation 
Decentralised: state health funds 
make decisions  
Central funding criteria by 
Federal Health Commission, but 
not enforced 
Decentralised: no nationwide standards 
Selective contracts between payers and 
providers, outside of collective 
contracting system 
Decentralised development: Styrian 
sickness funds developed Therapie 
Aktiv, spread to six of nine Federal 
states 
In general: different approaches 
across Federal States 
Centralised, „top down‟ development: 
nationwide uniform standards for content and 
evaluation defined by Federal Joint Committee 
(G-BA) 
Decentralised programmes: usually within 
collective contracting system, although direct 
contracts with providers are possible 
Source: Austrian and German case studies.
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Table 5: Implementation of DMPs in Austria and Germany 
 Austria: Therapie Aktiv Germany 
Up-take by 
payers 
 Implemented in six of nine Federal States 
 Slow progress for other DMPs, up-take differs by provinces 
 Implemented by virtually all sickness funds 
Up-take by 
providers 
 Acceptance is still a weakness  
 Participation is 15.3 per cent on average in regions where Therapie 
Aktiv is implemented, ranging from 8.8 per cent of eligible physicians 
in Vienna to 25 per cent in Upper Austria (as of September 2012) 
 Acceptance has grown considerably 
 Participation ranges from just under 60 per cent to over 90 per cent across 
KV regions (as of 2010) 
Up-take by 
patients 
 Relatively low: about 32,000 people with diabetes in the DMP 
Therapie Aktiv (approx. 7.7 per cent of estimated diabetics in Austria) 
 Relatively high: over 3 million people with diabetes in the DMP Diabetes 
type II (over 50 per cent of estimated diabetics in Germany)  
Development of 
structures 
 In some states (eg Styria) provision of help to re-structure practice 
organisation  
 Intent to integrate required documentation better in physician software 
 
 Better training of medical assistants to organise delivery of DMPs  
 Mandatory electronic documentation for DMPs since 2008 
 A monitoring culture has been fostered and has prompted medical 
representatives to develop more in-depth National Care Guidelines 
 Joint institutions at regional level between sickness funds and providers 
disseminate feedback to individual physicians  
Availability of 
evaluations 
 Evaluation efforts currently on their way  
 So far robust evaluation hardly exists or is not publicly available 
 Concerns over insufficient quality assurance of medical documentation 
of DMP participants 
 
 Mandatory evaluation of clinical outcomes and costs 
 Robustness of available evaluations remains disputed 
 Concerns over insufficient quality assurance of medical documentation of 
DMP participants  
Source: Austrian and German case studies. 
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Table 6: Implementation of mechanisms to foster cross-sectoral innovation in Austria and Germany 
 Austria: Reformpool Germany: integrated care contracts (§ 140) 
Up-take by 
payers 
 Low compared to Germany – activity peaked in 2008 with 34 
simultaneously running projects for a population of 8.8 million SHI 
insurees 
 De facto hardly any new projects since 2009 
 High compared to Austria – over 6000 contracts in 2008 for a population 
of about 70 million SHI insurees 
 Dynamics have levelled off since 2009, about 6000 contracts (no precise 
information available) 
 Little further development in population-oriented cross-sectoral networks 
Up-take by 
providers 
 Relatively high up-take in 2007 and 2008 
 Stagnation since 2009 
 Relatively high up-take between 2004 and 2008 
 Stagnation since 2009 
Up-take by 
patients 
 No comprehensive information available 
 Some projects do not rely on patient enrolment (eg discharge 
management) 
 No comprehensive information available 
 Estimates suggest an increase from about 1.6 million in 2008 to 1.9 million 
in 2011 
Development of 
structures 
 
 
 No legal obligation to introduce successful projects into routine care 
 Limited dissemination of successful initiatives to other regions 
 Formation of innovative cross-sectoral population-oriented networks 
 But in the majority of contracts, little genuine transformation of cross-
sectoral delivery structures 
 No legal obligation to introduce successful projects into routine care 
 Limited dissemination of successful initiatives to other regions 
Availability of 
evaluations 
 Mandatory evaluation of clinical outcomes and costs, eg via the 
controlling instrument Reformpool manager 
 Evaluation exists for some projects, but is very difficult and obtained 
results are ambiguous 
 
 No mandatory evaluation 
 With few exceptions, limited transparency about clinical outcomes and 
costs 
Source: Austrian and German case studies; (SVR, 2012), (Hofmarcher, 2012), (Busse et al., 2013). 
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5. Implementation barriers and levers 
This chapter analyses major implementation barriers and levers to explain policy 
outcomes in Austria and Germany. The first section will focus on cross-sectoral 
initiatives via the Reformpool (Austria) and integrated care contracts (Germany). The 
second section will focus on the implementation of DMPs in both countries, with a 
focus on diabetes mellitus type 2. The structure of the analysis follows the conceptual 
framework by concentrating on four major groups of actors in the implementation 
process: payers, provider representatives, practitioners and patients. For each 
stakeholder group, factors are identified and analysed with regard to their influence as 
barriers or levers on policy outcomes. Broadly, these factors are categorised according 
to the set of core actor characteristics identified in the conceptual framework: 
motivation, information and power/capacity. Tables 6 and 7 present a synthesis of 
implementation barriers and levers as regards cross-sectoral initiatives via the 
Reformpool and integrated care contracts, and DMPs, respectively. 
 
5.1 Cross-sectoral initiatives: the Reformpool (AT) and integrated care contracts (DE) 
Payers 
(1a) Motivation: financial incentives 
Between 2004 and 2008, payers in Germany had a positive incentive to use “start-up 
funding” for integrated care contracts. Funds were extra (from the payer‟s perspective) 
and simply had to be invested. Apart from staff time necessary to develop and monitor 
contracts, the financial impact on sickness funds was therefore cost-neutral from the 
outset, with a potential for positive health, economic and marketing effects. The expiry 
of start-up funding in late 2008 has removed this incentive. Since 2009, the situation is 
dominated by the fear of competitive disadvantage when investing in projects that have 
high initial costs with uncertain and delayed (financial) gains. Fears of having to raise 
an „extra‟ insurance premium above the uniform premium encourages efforts to save 
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money in the short-term instead of attempting to transform care delivery in the longer-
term. 
No external incentive mechanisms, such as competition or reputation effects, exist for 
Austrian sickness funds to motivate them to offer novel forms of care. Some 
interviewed experts from Austria see the lack of competition between payers as a 
stabilising factor that supports inertia in the system. In Germany, however, despite the 
formal existence of competition, this incentive does hardly exist either, as sickness 
funds hardly compete on price or quality. Insurance premiums are uniform, and a 
comprehensive benefits basket is regulated centrally, although sickness funds are 
required to offer their insurees special optional tariffs (eg with bonuses or reduced co-
payments) for participation in novel forms of care (eg DMPs, integrated care contracts, 
general practitioner-centred contracts). Nevertheless, a rudimental form of price 
competition exists: if sickness funds overspend their allocations from the Central 
Health Fund in one year, they must levy an additional premium on top of the uniform 
premium for the next year. A widely cited reason for SHI fund‟s reluctance to invest in 
care management programmes is the fear that investments might force them to collect 
an additional premium. Substantial member losses of a large SHI fund, DAK, after the 
introduction of an additional premium is cited as a major reason not to risk any longer-
term investments in the first place. 
In Austria, the incentive design was problematic from the outset. Funds are virtual and 
become available only after existing commitments (eg physician bills, mandatory 
contributions to state hospital funds, prescriptions) have been met. Furthermore, 
Reformpool projects are required to provide shared financial benefit for SHI and State 
governments. Experience from the past years suggests, however, that what constitutes a 
shared benefit was difficult to agree on in practice. Even if total costs for the system 
were likely to be reduced, the lack of genuinely shared financial responsibility between 
SHI and State governments meant that payers have to invest in the short term, but cost-
savings, if there are any, will be (i) delayed and (ii) likely to materialise in another 
sector, such as in the case of reduced hospital admissions as a result of better 
ambulatory care. In a context where Austrian sickness funds are required to balance 
income and expenditure and many are already in debt, any extra investment that is not 
strictly necessary becomes unlikely. What is more, in calculating costs, the two partners 
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often have different viewpoints. For example, the federal states as hospital owners 
might argue that fixed costs will not be reduced by a shift to the outpatient sector, thus 
factoring in only variable costs as a basis for financial shifting. More generally, as 
funds will necessarily be transferred when a project is moved to regular reimbursement, 
the partner losing the services from its sector will downplay the own financial 
contribution, as it can no longer direct these funds.  
In Germany, a response to this problem of having to mobilise additional funds out of 
existing budgets to pay for integrated care contracts is the legal requirement for payers 
to downwards adjust collective contracts for the service volume provided in (selective) 
integrated care contracts. Downwards adjustment of collective provider remuneration 
can, however, not only be technically but also politically burdensome. Sickness funds 
may have to bargain with KVs over the magnitude of the correction and, as consensus 
is rarely found, face an arbitration procedure to find a solution that delays the process 
of implementation. This effort is often seen as outweighing any potential benefits from 
integrated care contracts. In contrast to this type of contract which is intended to 
substitute for care delivered under the collective contract (“substitutive contract”), 
downwards adjustment is not necessary for a contract expanding on existing services 
(“add-on contract”). Given the principle of ensuring stability in insurance contribution 
rates, the latter however increasingly lead to objections by regulatory authorities, ie the 
Federal Insurance Office, and are thus becoming rarer. 
 
(1b) Motivation: national criteria and requirements  
Apart from the role of financial incentives, experiences from Austria and Germany also 
highlight the multi-faceted impact of national criteria on facilitating or hindering 
regional projects. In Germany, the use of „start-up funding‟ was unrestricted; even what 
should count as „integrated care‟ had not been specified. The German experience 
suggests that such a flexible policy design can trigger a substantial increase in the 
number of projects. However, the absence of national funding criteria and quality 
standards also in part explains the disappointed expectations of policy-makers, eg over 
the rather narrow scope of many projects that did little to transform delivery processes 
and structures. 
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In Austria, in contrast, a formal national framework, defined by the Federal Health 
Commission, specifies the general aims and types of Reformpool projects, eleven 
overarching selection criteria for Reformpool projects, and requirements for 
documentation, evaluation and information exchange.
5
 However, the funding procedure 
is perceived as bureaucratic obstacle that requires justification for any deviation. The 
formal application procedure appears to be perceived as overly burdensome. As a 
result, interviews with Austrian stakeholders suggest that in some cases, sickness funds 
or state governments prefer to commission projects outside the Reformpool mechanism 
on a more informal basis, because then there is no requirement to decide unanimously 
with another stakeholder and to meet criteria as regards transparency or evaluation.  
Another key insight relates to the mandatory or voluntary character of national 
frameworks. In Austria, adherence to the funding criteria is de facto voluntary. Health 
Platforms have much discretion in interpreting the national criteria. Adherence is 
neither ex-ante linked to the mobilisation of funds via the Reformpool, nor ex-post 
enforced with sanctions and, thus, depends on the goodwill of SHI and provincial 
governments. What is more, the legal character of the framework remains disputed. 
Only very basic requirements can be found in the 15a-agreement which becomes actual 
law. Most of the funding criteria exist in the form of a resolution by the Federal Health 
Commission and are phrased in the form of mandatory regulations (“has to”). However, 
the resolution is neither a law nor an ordinance by a ministry. Also, Health Platforms 
might see it as an interference with their work, despite the fact that federal government, 
SHI and states are the major player in the Commission itself. In Germany, although not 
even voluntary standards exist as regards service quality and evaluation, there are 
however strict financial regulations for novel forms of care. Payer representatives 
interviewed see these regulations as increasingly limiting their contractual flexibility. In 
particular, payers may face legal difficulties if they want to invest into longer-term 
selective contracts. Since 2012, the Federal Health Insurance Office (BVA) has been 
responsible for ensuring that selective contracts fully recover their investment costs 
                                                                    
5
 These include e.g. the requirement for a shared benefit between sickness fund and state government, 
quality assurance measures, an evaluation plan of cost, volume and quality ex-ante and ex-post, a plan to 
ensure sustainability of investments, and the requirement to share savings (or additional costs that have 
arisen) following project completion. The national framework also requires Health Platforms, who 
distribute Reformpool funds at a regional level, to define requirements for documentation and evaluation 
of project effects, and points to the need for institutionalising information exchange via minimum 
standards for documentation and ongoing reporting, central documentation of all projects and exchange 
of experiences . 
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within a limited timeframe (usually one year, or three years). This re-financing clause is 
intended to safeguard stability in insurance contributions. However, the purely financial 
character of existing regulations and their timeframe are seen as too narrow by some 
stakeholders to recognise the effort required for fundamental structural changes. 
 
(2) Information: lack of evaluations 
Stakeholders in both countries see the lack of information about health and economic 
effects as a major source of uncertainty among payers. In principle, sickness funds in 
both countries have rich information from provider claims that could be used to 
monitor and evaluate projects. In the past, however, this data has frequently either not 
been used, or not been publicly made available. According to a recent survey in 
Germany, only 4.9 per cent of sickness funds always evaluate their contracts, 17.1 per 
cent never evaluate, 22 per cent evaluate usually and 56.1 per cent conduct a partial 
evaluation. Among sickness funds who do conduct evaluations of integrated care 
contracts, almost 90 per cent never or only partially publicise their findings (SVR 
2012). The logic behind this culture of non-disclosure is that in an insurance market 
where sickness funds are supposed to compete for market share, they have little 
incentive to share their business „failures‟ and „successes‟ with competitors.  
The absence of a feedback-loop remains a key gap in both Austria and Germany. 
Evaluation and publication of project effects is not mandatory (Germany) or not 
enforced (Austria). The absence of robust and transparent outcome measurement 
weakens arguments for a nationwide roll-out of projects. However, even initiatives 
which suggest positive clinical and economic effects (eg Integrierte Versorgung 
Schlaganfall in Upper Austria) have not spread to other states. As a result, our 
interviews confirm a widespread perception that too little is known about costs and 
outcomes of integrated care contracts. This has implications for the knowledge gain 
from these projects for the SHI system as a whole. If hardly any robust evaluations are 
published, other sickness funds are unlikely to start similar initiatives, as the 
uncertainty over unintended cost impacts may seem too high. 
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(3a) Power: actor relations 
In Austria, cultural informal animosities between some states and social security 
institutions, as well as among states and within SHI, also impede progress. To some 
extent, strong tensions between SHI, physicians and physician representatives seem to 
inhibit the implementation of projects. The interviews confirmed that in some cases, 
ideas were rejected also because they were developed by some other institution, 
perceived as a rival. There seemed to be a perception that something developed 
elsewhere cannot be right. As a result, informal aspects in power and decision-making 
that are often neglected in analysis seemed in part to determine whether a project was 
introduced or not. 
 
(3b) Power: technical and staff capacity 
Stakeholders in Austria, and to some extent Germany, also refer to gaps in technical 
and staff capacity as regards public health and economics. Many sickness funds tend to 
see themselves predominantly as public administration, rather than strategic 
entrepreneurs that invest in population-oriented medicine in order to shape local care 
delivery and improve outcomes for their insurees. In Austria, questions of scale may 
reinforce this situation; given that many states have fewer than 600,000 inhabitants and 
analytic capacity in the smaller sickness funds is more restricted.  
Gaps in capacity to interpret the uncertainty in available information thus also appear 
limit some payers‟ willingness to engage with novel forms of care. Stakeholders from 
both Austria and Germany point out that especially smaller sickness funds set little trust 
in ambitious far-reaching projects whose impact they feel unable to estimate. This 
implies that not only is insufficient information a problem, but also real or perceived 
asymmetry of information, if payers receive a project proposal from a provider group 
or management company who may have built up more expertise in this area. 
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Provider representatives 
(1) Motivation: financial incentives 
In both Austria and Germany, the provider representatives traditionally in charge of 
collective contracting have limited motivation to support cross-sectoral initiatives via 
the Reformpool or integrated care contracts, respectively. In Austria, this appears to be 
because the Chamber of Physicians may generally see little benefit in projects that 
attempt to re-structure care to the optimal setting (thereby potentially reducing costs to 
the health system, but also provider incomes). Projects that expand on existing services 
tend to be viewed more favourably.  
In Germany, regional KVs have been given no systemic incentive to support selective 
contracts. First, they are confronted with the parallel existence of selective and 
collective contracting. From their perspective, this dual system has raised serious 
doubts about who is now responsible for ensuring appropriate access to care – a 
statutory duty that in the German ambulatory sector has been delegated from 
Government also to providers in the form of regional KVs, and not solely to sickness 
funds, as in Austria. Second, KVs also face reductions in their revenues, as they are 
paid from a fixed proportion of the turnover of each SHI physician in that region. 
Selective contracts threaten the income (and ultimately existence) of KVs, as they 
require a reduction of the global sum paid to regional KVs based on collective contracts 
by the service volume delivered in a selective contract. Consequently, there is little 
systemic incentive to support selective contracts even as an external service provider 
for functions such as controlling that individual physicians may find difficult to handle. 
 
(2) Information: existence and impact of policies 
Provider representatives in both countries tend to have generally good knowledge about 
the existence and scope of the Reformpool mechanism and integrated care contracting, 
respectively. Their knowledge about the effects of available projects, however, remains 
limited, as for the other stakeholder groups in the respective health system. In 
Germany, a particularly controversial informational problem for regional KVs is the 
difficulty to estimate the scope of service volumes in collective contracts that is being 
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substituted by selective contracts. Gaps in information introduce additional complexity 
into evaluating true service shifts between collective and selective contracting systems. 
 
(3) Power: existence of veto points 
Provider representatives in both Germany and Austria retain a veto point whose 
strength, however, differs between the countries. In Austria, the Chamber of Physicians 
retains a powerful role to facilitate or hinder progress in projects that seek to improve 
coordination and integration of care. If a project seeks to deviate from collective 
agreement in terms of service coverage or levels or types remuneration, consent of the 
Chamber of Physicians is required. In the past, this veto point appears to have 
sometimes impeded progress in Austria. When eg “ambulatory care centres” were to be 
included into the 15a-agreement of 2008-2013, the nearly finalised version of two of its 
articles was completely abolished due to protests by physicians and replaced by a 
clause stating the intent to set up a working group to find suitable models by the end of 
2008. 
In Germany, although KVs are formally excluded from integrated care contracting, 
they can nevertheless slow down negotiations. As described above, selective contracts 
that substitute for service volume in collective contracts require a corresponding 
downwards adjustment of the global sum paid to regional KVs for outpatient 
physicians. Refusal on the side of KVs leads to tedious arbitration procedures for 
payers and can be seen as significant effort to implement an integrated care contract. 
Although some stakeholders note the exclusion of regional KVs from selective 
contracting has enabled individual providers to bypass entrenched institutional 
structures and conclude direct contracts more easily, others note that regional KVs thus 
retain some form of real political influence over progress in selective contracting. 
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Practitioners  
(1) Motivation: financial incentives 
In Germany, integrated care contracts had been possible since 2000 – without much 
success – but were kick-started when “start-up funding” between 2004 and 2008 
enabled sickness funds to withhold 1 per cent of total hospital and SHI physician 
remuneration to finance (preferably) cross-sectoral or interdisciplinary projects. This 
effectively meant that payment for inpatient and outpatient care was reduced and 
providers felt the need to engage in projects in order to re-gain the funds deducted in 
advance. This was not resisted by individual providers, only by regional KVs who had 
however been excluded from integrated care contracting. In Germany, this meant that, 
although the global remuneration to providers was reduced, individual incomes of 
practitioners would not necessarily decrease, provided that practitioners would succeed 
in securing compensatory selective contracts. As by definition selective contracts 
would not cover all providers, this implied a potential gain for some at the expense of 
others who were less successful in negotiating contracts.  
In Austria and Germany since 2009, financial risk lies with the project initiators. While 
the „start-up funding‟ framework in Germany had earmarked funds to foster innovation 
in the system at the expense of the totality of SHI providers, currently the project 
initiators will usually have to pay upfront to develop care projects, and invest in 
necessary IT or management infrastructure. However, there is high uncertainty over 
returns on investment. Neither in Austria nor in Germany can project initiators be 
certain to have their initiative commissioned by payers. This will reduce the willingness 
to set up a project in the first place. 
For current providers of health care and their representatives, there is little incentive to 
engage in projects that seek to reduce costs. In fact, projects in Austria tend to rather 
expand services than reduce them, thus filling gaps instead of rearranging service 
delivery. In Germany, experiences suggest that group and bargaining processes at local 
level are time- and resource-intensive and only few enthusiasts seem willing to invest 
this effort. Financing problems but also operational and technical issues, such as 
incompatible IT interfaces, further limit further practitioners‟ motivation to engage in 
the development of integrated care structures.  
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(2) Information: existence of cross-sectoral projects 
The degree of information of local practitioners as regards novel forms of care appears 
to be difficult to estimate. In Austria, the degree of information among office-based 
physicians in Austria cannot be said with certainty. It can be expected that physicians 
know about individual Reformpool projects in their region, but general knowledge 
about the development of projects is estimated to be limited. In Germany, experiences 
from successful regional integrated care networks suggest that a long-term strategy of 
both information and motivational levers is critical to achieve and sustain participation 
of outpatient physicians in novel forms of care. Therefore, as interviewees point out, 
practitioners may generally be aware of the Reformpool or integrated care contracts, 
but their actual degree of information (and participation) is likely to depend also on 
efforts of local project managers.  
 
(3) Capacity: negotiation of profitable contracts 
In terms of capacity for providers to negotiate profitable contracts with payers, a key 
success factor for regional population-oriented cross-sectoral networks in Germany is 
the existence of professional network management. Such network can centralise much 
of the legal and economic skill required to negotiate contracts, but also competences in 
internal controlling and organisation to ensure that integration is actually “lived” in 
practice. In Austria, outpatient providers have in principle one main SHI fund per 
region (about 80 per cent of people are insured with their provincial sickness funds, the 
remainder is insured with occupation-based sickness funds) (Hofmarcher, 2012), while 
in Germany, even the largest association of all 146 SHI funds (Allgemeine 
Ortskrankenkassen, AOK) has only a regional market share of about 35 per cent 
(among the about 85 per cent of Germans with SHI, thus below 30 per cent of all 
Germans) (VdEK, 2011). This makes it even less profitable for providers to enter into 
agreements only with a single SHI fund, as they then would face the medically, 
ethically and economically absurd situation of having to treat patients from different 
sickness funds differently. Austrian outpatient physicians are not confronted with this 
problem. However, so far they do not appear to have taken up this structural advantage 
over to their German colleagues. 
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Patients 
(1) Motivation 
Active patient participation in efforts to improve care coordination across sectors may 
not always be necessary. Process improvements, such as discharge management 
involving more rapid information exchange between hospital staff, office-based 
physicians and ambulatory nursing teams, for instance, might not require direct patient 
consent. To ensure seamless follow-up care, they are simply provided. A similar logic 
applies to structural advancements such as putting in place multi-disciplinary teams or 
case managers. Clinical and managerial motivation and leadership will be much more 
decisive for these models. 
 
(2) Information 
Generally, our interviews with stakeholders in Austria and Germany suggest that often 
the benefits of innovative care models and thus reasons to join may not be entirely 
clear. This potential problem for motivation is intrinsically linked to ways in which 
information is provided to patients and the general public. Both in Germany and 
Austria, patients appear to face two fundamental information gaps. First, they do not 
have an overview over available care models. Second, there is little transparency about 
the patient-relevant outcomes (eg mortality, long-term quality of life) from existing 
projects. This lack of information appears to pose barriers to the future participation of 
patients in care management models in both countries. 
 
(3) Capacity 
The capacity of patients to shape the development and implementation of innovative 
cross-sectoral care models seems limited in both countries. Patients are not usually 
involved in the design of integrated care models. Typically, they are dependent on care 
models being offered to them by providers and their SHI fund. This raises questions 
over unused potential of patients. Stronger involvement of patients in the 
implementation of care models could help to drive large-scale change, by putting a 
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stronger emphasis on the actual health needs and preferences of those who are 
ultimately affected most. 
Summary of critical points 
In summary, some critical points can be identified from experience in promoting local 
innovation in cross-sectoral projects through the Reformpool mechanism (Austria) and 
integrated care contracting (Germany): 
 The importance of having funds to pay for integrated care initiatives that are 
earmarked and additional from the payer‟s perspective; 
 The importance of ensuring evaluation of the availability and health and 
economic effects of integrated care initiatives to foster transparency and 
acceptance among payers, providers and patients; 
 The importance of reviewing technical capacity of payers and providers to 
develop and implement integrated care initiatives.  
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Table 7: Actor characteristics affecting the implementation of cross-sectoral projects 
 Motivation Information Power/ Capacity 
 AT DE AT DE AT DE 
Payers 
Low: virtual nature of 
funds, limited shared 
financial interest between 
payers 
Perceived bureaucratic 
hurdles 
High (2004-08): 
additional, dedicated funds 
Low (since 2009): no extra 
funds, political and 
technical effort of 
lowering provider budgets 
Perceived regulatory 
barriers 
Low: with few exceptions, 
little transparency about 
health and economic 
effects 
Low: with few exceptions, 
little transparency about 
health and economic 
effects 
Medium/low: regional 
single payers, but 
sectoral fragmented 
budgets and 
entrepreneurial thinking 
just starting 
Medium/low: some 
funds with large market 
share, but competition 
reduces potential impact 
and entrepreneurial 
thinking just starting 
Provider 
representatives 
Medium/high: expansion 
of services 
Low: re-structuring of 
care to optimal setting 
Low: KVs exlcuded from 
selective contracts, which 
in turn reduce their 
revenues and complicate 
their duty to guarantee 
equal access to care  
High: general knowledge 
about Reformpool 
mechanism  
High: general knowledge 
about selective contracts 
Low: knowledge of 
regional service provision 
but complexity of 
evaluating true service 
shifts between collective 
and selective contracting 
Low: formal 
involvement (eg only 
one seat in the FHC 
compared to 7 for the 
federal government, 9 
for the federal states or 6 
for SHI)  
High: real political 
influence (see p40)  
Low: formal 
involvement  
Medium: real political 
influence, as refusal to 
lower the global sum for 
outpatient care leads to 
tedious arbitration 
procedures for payers 
Individual 
providers 
Variable: depends on 
whether project is 
perceived as additional 
bureaucratic burden 
High (2004-08): prospect 
of additional income, 
opportunity to shape local 
care delivery 
Low (since 2009): little 
economic incentive to 
invest or cooperate with 
others in a generally 
competitive climate 
Variable: depends on 
effort of local project 
managers 
Variable: depends on 
effort of local project 
managers 
Low: as traditional „lone 
fighter‟ 
Medium/high: with 
professional 
management  
Low: as traditional „lone 
fighter‟ 
High: with professional 
management, 
organisational structures, 
IT 
Patients 
Uncertain: with few 
exceptions, benefits may 
not be clear  
Not relevant: process 
improvement, eg managed 
discharge 
Uncertain: with few 
exceptions, benefits may 
not be clear 
Not relevant: process 
improvement, eg managed 
discharge 
Low: with few exceptions, 
little transparency on 
patient-relevant endpoints 
and available models 
Low: with few exceptions, 
little transparency on 
patient-relevant endpoints 
and available models 
Low: generally little 
involvement in 
designing care models 
 
Low: generally little 
involvement in designing 
care models 
 
Source: Austrian and German case studies.
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5.2 Disease Management Programmes 
Payers 
(1) Motivation: financial incentives 
The incentive design for payers to participate strongly differs between Austria and 
Germany. In Austria, funds for the development and evaluation of DMPs have to come 
out of the existing financial resources, without any external incentive. Investments of 
sickness funds in better ambulatory care are also unlikely to pay off, eg in the form of 
reduced hospital admissions, because sickness funds always pay a fixed proportion of 
SHI contributions to state hospital funds, regardless of total hospital expenditure. 
Without the prospect of returns on investment, payers‟ motivation to engage with 
DMPs appears limited. In Germany, in contrast, funds for DMPs are formally provided 
on top of existing allocations. There have been two stages of incentive design in 
Germany. In the first stage, until 2009, DMP enrolment was a separate category in the 
risk structure adjustment (RSA) mechanism between sickness funds. Sickness funds 
would receive higher allocations for every DMP participant which more accurately 
reflected their actual expenditure compared to non-enrolled chronically ill people. This 
arrangement was not only an effective incentive for sickness funds to increase DMP 
enrolment rates, but due to its re-distributive character it also did not impose any 
additional costs on the health system. 
With the introduction of a morbidity-oriented RSA in 2009, which covers 80 conditions 
in total, including the six DMP indications, DMP enrolment as an RSA category 
became obsolete. Sickness funds now receive a programme flat fee for each enrolled 
DMP patient per year to cover sickness funds‟ administrative costs (2009: €55.00; 
2012: €30.24) and there is extra remuneration for doctors. Thus, for any diabetes 
patient who is enrolled in the DMP diabetes, sickness funds receive a standard 
allocation based on the patient‟s age, sex and diagnosis, and an extra fee to cover DMP 
programme costs. The level of the programme flat fee depends on average programme 
costs and is set annually by the National Association of sickness funds. Although the 
size of the incentive is thus much lower than before 2009 and in principle “only” cost-
neutral, by 2009 all sickness funds had already introduced DMPs and the initial 
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investment of developing and implementing DMPs had been recovered. The 
programme flat fee thus simply enables sickness funds to continue running DMPs. 
 
(2) Information 
Improved health outcomes and cost-savings among DMP participants might be 
expected eg in the form of reduced emergency hospital admissions due to acute 
complications. Information on such effects of DMPs is limited, however. In both 
countries, robust evaluation of health and economic effects is either hardly available 
(Austria) or mainly focused on measuring process improvements rather than patient-
relevant endpoints such as mortality, morbidity and quality of life, or payer-relevant 
endpoints such as cost (Germany). 
 
(3) Capacity/ Power 
The DMP Therapie Aktiv is a notable exception in Austria, as it is so far the only DMP 
that is in a very comparable format offered in several (six of nine) Federal States either 
as a Reformpool project or already in routine care. A key factor for the (at least partial) 
regional dissemination of Therapie Aktiv and translation into routine care appears to 
have been the provision of a template to adapt the programme that was provided by the 
SV-funded Competence Centre Integrierte Versorgung. In this case individual sickness 
funds thus did at least not face the initial costs of developing the programme.  
 
Provider representatives 
(1) Motivation 
In Germany, national provider representatives were generally supportive of the medical 
rationale underlying DMPs. Only the linkage to the risk structure mechanism (RSA) 
was strongly criticised as framing DMPs as a predominantly fiscal rather than medical 
instrument and inducing sickness funds to try to influence physicians and patients to 
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maximise DMP enrolment rates for monetary reasons. In Austria, the Chamber of 
Physicians has always been highly sceptical about the idea of medical guidelines from 
the beginning and strongly opposed the idea of introducing them at the national level, 
as it is stated in the health reform law of 2005 (Czypionka et al., 2006b). Regarding 
DMPs in particular, “cookbook medicine” was cited as a widespread perception by 
medical representatives in the interviews. As an example, in Lower Austria the DMP 
was cancelled by the local chamber of physicians in 2009. Representatives stated as 
one reason that “physicians know how to treat diabetics anyway and are used to 
engaging in continuous training efforts in a fashion that is alien to most other 
professions” (translation of a citation in Czypionka et al 2009: 4) 
A form of „loss aversion‟ appears to have been a concrete incentive for regional KVs in 
Germany to participate in DMPs. As sickness funds were enabled to also contract 
directly with individual providers but the income of regional KVs directly depends on 
physicians‟ turnover, direct DMP contracts bypassing KVs would also reduce (albeit to 
a limited extent) the income of KVs. Moreover, some KVs were forerunners in 
concluding DMP contracts with sickness funds. Given that overall funds in the 
ambulatory system are fixed, the higher financial allocations to DMP participants were 
perceived as leading to re-distributions of financial flows, at the disadvantage of 
regions and doctors who did not offer DMPs. This dual threat of direct contracting 
combined with potential perceived financial flows into other regions proved an 
effective lever for KVs to participate in DMPs contracts. Similar to payers, provider 
representatives had thus strong motives to pass on financial incentives and 
communicate benefits of DMPs to physicians. 
 
(2) Information: two-way approach to information 
While formal information given to medical representatives in Austria seems limited, 
provider representatives in Germany are generally well-informed about the 
development and up-dating process of DMPs. To ensure the medical credibility of 
DMPs, as supporting scientific institute (IQWIQ) to the Federal Joint Committee (G-
BA) is responsible for a robust evidence-based review and development process. 
Proposed revisions are widely disseminated for consultation to affected payer, provider 
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and patient groups, in order to ensure that all affected voices have a chance to comment 
and are heard. The G-BA, which is in charge of defining revisions to DMPs, is then 
required to take these comments into account. From a medical standpoint, stakeholders 
in Germany suggest that this combination of two-way approach to information – an 
evidence basis disseminated to provider representatives, and return feedback from the 
medical community – is what gives German-style DMPs their high standing among 
provider representatives. 
 
(3) Power/ capacity: equal involvement together with payers 
Germany and Austria illustrate two different combinations of aspects of power. The 
formal involvement of providers in the design of DMPs was high in Germany, and low 
in Austria. In Austria, the DMP Therapie Aktiv was developed with input from 
individual practitioners, but there was little formal involvement of the Chamber of 
Physicians in the process. Compared to Austria, Germany has a more formalised mode 
of self-governance in the Federal Joint Committee (G-BA), with equal input from 
payers and providers. Physician representatives have high formal participation in the 
development and definition of quality standards of DMPs at national level. On the other 
hand, actual political power of physician representatives to impede progress in DMPs is 
relatively low in Germany, but high in Austria. In Germany, the formalised mode of 
self-governance legally requires provider representatives to implement statutory duties 
(such as to develop DMPs). Constraints imposed by a system of mutual adjustments 
also mean that if provider representatives had blocked the design of DMPs, which was 
financially highly important to payers, then payers might have been likely to in turn 
impede progress in areas that were more important to provider representatives. In 
Austria, in contrast, the real political power of the Chamber of Physicians seems less 
constrained. For example, the duty of organising extramural rests with SHI alone, as 
opposed to Germany, where SGB V states that SHI and KV have a joint duty in 
securing healthcare provision (SGB V, § 72). By contrast, there is no way SHI can 
conclude selective contracts with physicians, but is obliged to collective contracting 
even with all specialities jointly. Therefore, SHI does not only need to involve 
physician representatives whenever trying new ways of health care delivery, but also to 
get their consent.  
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Practitioners  
(1a) Motivation: financial incentives 
In both countries, practitioners receive compensation for services provided to DMP 
patients and documentation. Physicians are paid for their service provided and, in 
addition, receive a capitation payment per treated DMP-patient per quarter. In Austria, 
the level of financial incentives is defined by individual sickness funds. In Lower 
Austria, for example, the physician is remunerated with €53 for the first examination 
and afterwards is paid €25 per quarter in addition to usual fees. For the training of 
insulin-dependent patients in small groups (3 to 5), a doctor receives €1,064 
(Czypionka et al., 2011).  
In Germany, physician payment seems slightly lower. Sickness funds receive a flat fee 
to remunerate physicians (2009: €125; 2012: €122,88) for each enrolled patient per 
year (AOK, 2012), which is uniform across sickness funds and is set each year by the 
national SHI confederation. How sickness funds distribute these incentives among 
doctors is defined in regional contracts, but generally there is a flat fee for primary 
documentation, advice and enrolment (about €25) and a fee for quarterly follow-up 
appointments and documentation (about €15) (Ärztezeitung, 2012). Additional 
compensation is paid for patient education sessions and trainings. The DMP contract in 
the region of KV Bayern, for instance, includes patient training modules eg on diabetes 
self-management, intensified insulin therapy which physicians may offer to (depending 
on the specific module) groups of 4 to 12 patients in 4 to 12 sessions for €25 to €50 per 
patient per session (KVB, 2011). 
A key difference lies the ways in which these incentives are embedded in general 
provider payment systems. In Germany, financial incentives for DMPs are appreciated 
as extra-budgetary income which provides the opportunity for additional revenues, 
beyond a capped budget. In Austria, in contrast, where degressive value scales but no 
budgets exist, DMPs appear to be seen as services which might „crowd out‟ other (in 
sum more) profitable services. For a purely economically-oriented physician, this may 
lead to the conclusion that the effort required to implement a DMP exceeds the 
potential monetary gain derived from spending one‟s time on other tasks. 
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For ambulatory SHI physicians in Germany, DMPs were the first nationwide case 
where a commitment to evidence-based care was explicitly linked to financial rewards. 
Such rewards were perceived not only as economic gains but also as a signal of 
appreciation. In light of perceived trends towards more services to be delivered in a 
budget without corresponding pay increases, the introduction of an extra-budgetary 
reward positively contrasted with overall remuneration trends. Thus, in a context where 
incomes of generalist practices had been perceived as stagnating or declining for years 
in real terms, these incentives served as a welcome extra source of income.  
 
(1b) Motivation: professional values 
Interviews with stakeholders in Germany and Austria point to the complex impact of 
professional values on physicians‟ motivation to decide for or against participation in 
DMPs. One (relatively small) group of physicians, „forerunners‟ in adopting principles 
of evidence-based medicine, appear to have immediately embraced the idea of DMPs 
as offering opportunities to offer better care to patients. 
The interviews suggest that, from a medical standpoint, a relatively large group of 
doctors may at least initially feel ambivalent about DMPs. 
In both Austria and Germany, office-based physicians are used to work independently, 
making decisions based on professional judgement. As DMPs are accompanied by 
guidelines and documentation, the classical argument advanced by opponents is the 
fear that DMPs might restrict the physician‟s therapeutic freedom and interfere with the 
doctor-patient relationship. However, additional complexity arises as not all physicians 
seem to agree about the boundaries of their work. Experience from both Austria and 
Germany suggests that physicians may either feel unwilling or unable to go beyond 
treating symptoms of a disease, and also tackle root causes that stem from behavioural 
and social factors. A physician representative in Austria thinks people are primarily 
responsible for themselves and neither payers nor providers should convince them to 
participate in a DMP. Apart from these wider questions of optimal disease 
management, formal enrolment of patients in a DMP can also be perceived as 
burdensome.  
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(2) Information: role of opinion leaders 
In Austria, a key problem appears to result from the transmission of inaccurate 
information to physicians. There appears to be an imbalance of information, in 
particular as regards rumours of enormous bureaucracy. DMP opponents dominate any 
positive voices and the potentially counter-balancing role of SHI in communicating 
benefits of the DMP to (individual) physicians is perceived as rather passive. In many 
cases physicians are misinformed and think documentation is more time-consuming 
than it is. In practice, once a patient is enrolled and the initial documentation is made, 
the physician only has to fill in a one-page form a year for every patient. According to a 
payer representative, administrative requirements were already reduced to almost a half 
and now work electronically via the physicians‟ software. However, the software needs 
to be purchased, maintained and updated regularly creating additional costs. 
Experiences from Austria and Germany point to a powerful role of medical 
representatives and local opinion leaders in shaping physicians‟ acceptance of 
guidelines. Following the cascades of information and influence at a practice level, 
patients usually trust their family practitioner most, and will be inclined to follow the 
doctor‟s recommendation for or against participation in the DMP. Doctors in turn, 
although traditionally reputed as “lone fighters” in both Austria and Germany, do not 
operate in a social vacuum but are influenced by prevailing positions in the medical 
community. In Germany, stakeholders interviewed attribute the high participation 
among providers in part also to targeted communication strategies of payers who won 
over opinion leader eg by sending out outreach teams directly into physician practices 
to explain financial and medical benefits of DMPs. 
 
(3a) Power/capacity: medical aspects 
Patients‟ representatives and diabetes specialists in Austria attribute low participation 
partly to physicians' insufficient ability to treat diabetes correctly. It appears that 
seemingly standard tasks such as measurement of blood glucose levels or handling of 
insulin are skills that especially older practitioners do not always possess. The existing 
training course for the DMP is seen as too short given the complexity of the disease. 
Documentation requirements would reveal their lacking abilities. Physicians may be 
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reluctant to admit that more training is needed, also in light of prevailing public 
opinion, expressed for instance by the Chamber of Physicians, that doctors can treat 
diabetes perfectly and the quality of care as good. As neither outcome nor process 
measurement exists in the outpatient sector, it is difficult to find an objective reference 
point against that claim. 
 
(3b) Power/ capacity: organisational aspects 
Physicians think of documentation as an additional burden, although it is financially 
compensated. In Lower Austria, a physician receives €53 for the first examination and 
€25 for all subsequent examinations and additionally €1,064 for an insulin group 
training and €690.39 for a non-insulin group respectively. However, office-based 
physicians in Austria and Germany are self-employed and their services have to pay off 
economically. In Austria, the physician faces opportunity costs in the form of other 
services not provided, especially without support by trained staff. This issue is 
particularly pertinent in Austria where doctors are generally paid by fee-for-service 
without a ceiling. Although degression-rules are in place for some services, no general 
budget cap exists as it is the case in Germany. In Germany, financial incentives for 
DMPs are appreciated as extra-budgetary and thus as extra income, while in Austria, 
doctors can create this income with other services. Instead of a DMP-session, the 
physician could offer a number of other (in sum more) profitable services.  
Participation in a DMP thus also raises capacity issues, as it confronts an office-based 
physician with the need to re-organise, and to some extent standardise, practice 
workflows to cope with a higher number of more frequent routine medical tasks (eg 
regular blood pressure measurement). Re-organising their practice in line with DMP 
rules will pay off only when a certain threshold of patients is reached, which, 
depending on the practice, may fall somewhere between 80 and 250 patients 
participating in the DMP, according to Austria experts‟ estimates. Therefore, when a 
physician suspects fewer than this threshold number of patients to be eligible for 
enrolment, she might discourage even the ones who are interested.  
In Austria, contract physicians mainly work in single practice, which also appears to 
limit economies of scale in re-organising practice flows. In Germany, single-practices 
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are still wide-spread, but the number of group practices has grown over the past years. 
Experience from Germany suggests that for physicians who have managed to enrol and 
treat a relatively high number, eg 80 to 100 patients with diabetes, delegation to and 
collaboration with the receptionist and/or the medical assistant is critical. The 
availability of differentiated supply structures in the outpatient sector, such as second-
level diabetic specialist care in Germany, also appears to be a facilitating factor in 
centralising key tasks (eg patient training) and offering treatment for more complex 
patients. However, in some instances, this second-level also introduces additional 
coordination challenges and some generalist physicians suspect their colleagues of 
“luring” patients away. 
 
Patients 
(1) Motivation: financial incentives 
Both in Austria and in Germany, patients are by default in „standard care‟. Participation 
in a DMP or other novel care programme thus requires an active choice and 
confirmation of enrolment in such a programme. This seeks to ensure informed 
consent, stimulate patients' active involvement in the care process, and to know the 
number and characteristics of programme participants. In Germany, payers have started 
to offer financial incentives for patients to participate in DMPs. Since 2007, sickness 
funds are even required by Law to offer their insurees special optional tariffs (eg 
bonuses, waiving the quarterly ambulatory practice fee of €10) should they decide to 
enrol in a DMP or other novel form of care. In Austria, no financial incentives exist for 
patients, although their introduction had been discussed briefly. 
 
(2) Information 
Interviews with Austrian experts suggest that patients do not seem to be adequately 
informed about the availability and benefits of DMPs, as DMPs are largely “invisible” 
both in public debates and during physician consultations. Sickness funds also do not 
communicate extensively with their insurees about the opportunities of joining DMPs. 
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In Germany, both payers and providers started media campaigns and other information 
measures to communicate benefits of DMPs to patients. Different routes of 
communication have been used. These include:
 
 
 Telephone advice; 
 Personal letters inviting insurees to participate in a care model; 
 Programme-specific flyers; 
 Information magazines sent to all insurees regularly; 
 Information sessions. 
Not only is communication as such important. An appropriate style of communication, 
personalised and prepared to respond to a patient‟s potentially difficult medical and 
social situation, is also seen as essential by German sickness fund representatives, in 
order to enable the patient to ask questions and address potential concerns. 
 
(3) Capacity 
Interviewees note that DMPs tend to be, by definition, indication-oriented, not 
necessarily focused on the patient‟s holistic health needs. Despite the availability of 
certain patient education modules in both countries, some interviewees note that the 
general approach of DMPs does too little to address the needs of multi-morbid patients, 
for whom it might be difficult to participate in two or more DMPs but with little inter-
linkage between these different structured care programmes. Capacity of especially of 
older patients is also partly seen as difficult by stakeholders interviewed, given the 
behavioural changes that are required in DMPs and that have found to be difficult to 
implement and sustain in practice in some instances. 
 
Summary of critical points 
In summary, some critical points can be identified from the relative success in 
implementing DMPs in Germany as compared to Austria: 
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 Efforts in Germany to ensure medical credibility of DMPs through a robust 
evidence review process and strong consultation of the medical community; 
 
 Equal input of payers and providers in developing DMPs; 
 
 Strong financial incentives for payers and provider representatives especially in 
the initial phases of implementation, when DMPs had not yet been embedded 
into routine care and there was scepticism about their impact; 
 
 Strong efforts to provide financial incentives to practitioners and patients, but 
also intensive communication strategies involving medical opinion leaders, 
media campaigns and other informational measures to address practitioners and 
patients personally. 
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Table 8: Actor characteristics affecting the implementation of DMPs  
         
 
Motivation Information Power/ Capacity 
 
AT DE AT DE AT DE 
Payers 
Low: no additional 
funds provided for 
DMPs, needs to come 
out of existing funds 
High (until 2009): 
linkage to RSA 
Medium (since 
2009): programme 
costs are covered 
Medium/ low: 
limited evaluation, 
available studies seen 
to suffer from 
methodological 
shortcomings 
Medium/ high: 
evaluation and 
publication of 
(clinical) outcomes 
and costs is 
mandatory 
Medium/ high: 
template for DMP was 
centrally provided 
Medium/ high: 
national template for 
DMP contracts 
facilitated 
development 
Provider 
representatives 
Medium/ low: non-
participation has no 
impact; belief that 
quality of care is 
already good 
Medium/ high: non-
participation would 
enable direct contracts 
with practitioners 
Medium: visibility of 
DMPs varies 
High: DMPs were a 
highly visible policy 
Low: formal 
involvement  
High: real political 
influence  
High: formal 
involvement  
Medium: real 
political influence 
Individual 
providers 
Medium/ low: no 
budgets, DMPs crowd 
out other profitable 
services 
High: DMPs are 
extrabudgetary 
services 
Low: often false 
information about 
administrative effort 
High: strong 
communication 
through peers, SHI 
and physician advisers 
Often low: lack of 
delegation reduces 
logistic capacity 
especially in small 
solo practices 
Mostly high: re-
organisation of 
workflows via 
training of medical 
assistants was key 
Patients 
Variable: DMP design 
may only reach 
selective “healthy 
volunteers” 
Variable: DMP 
design may only reach 
selective “healthy 
volunteers” 
Low: little 
transparency about 
availability and 
benefits of DMPs 
High: strong 
communication by 
SHI and physicians 
Variable: capacity to 
participate varies 
Variable: capacity to 
participate varies 
Source: Austrian and German case studies.
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6. Conclusions 
With the introduction of DMPs and the Reformpool, Austria has taken measures to 
address perceived fragmentation in health care delivery. The comparative analysis we 
have carried out suggests the following key barriers to implementation of these 
measures. 
6.1 Motivation: incentive to participate? 
The current incentive structures in Austria do not sufficiently motivate or reward key 
actors involved in implementing policies to improve care coordination. In Germany the 
development of integrated care from 2004 onwards can be clearly attributed to the 
introduction of start-up funding which compensated payers and providers for investing 
in infrastructure, while strong financial incentives for payers and provider 
representatives to establish DMPs were passed on to practitioners and patients, leading 
to high provider participation and patient enrolment rates. Germany funded these 
initiatives by redistributing health system resources via linkage to the RSA and an 
earmarked reduction of 1 per cent in total hospital and SHI physician remuneration. 
The direct transferability of the German approaches to creating financial incentives to 
Austria is limited given that the Austrian RSA redistributes only about 2 per cent of 
expenses between provincial sickness funds (Hofmarcher, 2012) and the Chamber of 
Physicians would be likely to block any reduction in provider remuneration. However, 
the Federal level could (perhaps via the Federal Health Agency) provide earmarked 
funds to finance templates for the development, implementation and evaluation of 
innovative projects (see Section 7). 
6.2 Information: do key players know enough about the policy and its intended 
effects?  
We found considerable information deficits in Austria and Germany regarding the 
availability and content of novel forms of care and their intended health and economic 
effects. Lack of information lowers transparency and undermines incentives to 
participate. One exception was the case of DMPs in Germany. The period following the 
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introduction of DMPs was characterised by scepticism and distrust, particularly among 
office-based physicians. In response, payer and provider representatives launched 
extensive communication efforts targeting practitioners and patients and the 
involvement of peers and opinion leaders in these efforts proved to be critical to 
improving information about the availability and content of DMPs. 
In Austria stronger emphasis on robust evaluation and better communication about 
innovative care models are likely to play an essential role in increasing acceptance and 
uptake of these models among payers, providers and patients. 
6.3 Power and capacity: are key actors able to participate in novel forms of care? 
Our analysis suggests it is appropriate to question the power and capacity of those 
responsible for implementing care coordination policies in Austria. Payers seems to 
lack the technical capacity to develop and roll-out innovative care projects. It would 
therefore be useful to establish a central mechanism that supports the implementation 
process but does not interfere with provincial-level competences. 
The veto power of provider representatives has led to immobility and distrust on the 
part of payers and providers, as perceived by those we interviewed. Unless changes in 
the regulatory framework can successfully shift the balance of power, it seems 
advisable for SHI institutions to engage in more dialogue with provider representatives 
and practitioners to improve understanding and trust on both sides and facilitate 
progress. 
With regard to individual practitioners, our analysis clearly suggests that the financial 
incentives currently in place have not been sufficient to increase participation rates. 
Greater practical support to re-organise practice workflows and informal peer support 
to address provider questions about clinical and organisational aspects may help to 
strengthen the capacity of office-based physicians. 
Finally, for patients, it may be necessary to review the content of available 
programmes. This includes asking whether programmes are appropriately designed to 
reach target groups. 
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7. Recommendations  
 
This section discusses how the health system in Austria can move forward in improving 
care coordination for people with chronic conditions. We begin by recommending an 
important shift in emphasis, which we believe is an essential first step. We then identify 
actions intended to strengthen care coordination policy. Many of these actions fall 
within the remit of social health insurance but several will involve other actors. The 
section concludes with a reminder of some of the weaknesses of the Austrian health 
system that need to be addressed alongside efforts to improve care coordination. Unless 
these issues are addressed it may, in our view, be difficult to make progress. 
 
 
7.1 A shift in emphasis: from disease management to improving quality through 
coordinated care 
 
Current debate on care coordination in Austria focuses on how to increase the 
participation of physicians and patients in the diabetes DMP Therapie Aktiv. Social 
health insurance has set itself a goal of increasing patient enrolment to two thirds of 
pharmaceutically treated diabetes patients by 2015 (Hauptverband, 2012). Our analysis 
suggests it would be more appropriate and more effective to move away from focusing 
on individual disease management programmes and, instead, to focus on care 
coordination as part of a broader strategy to improve quality in health care delivery. We 
think this is important for the following reasons. 
 
First, it is important to distinguish policy goals from policy tools. Ensuring the 
provision of high quality health care is an instrumental goal that, if met, will help the 
health system to meet its ultimate objective – to improve health (WHO, 2000). Both 
theory and evidence indicate that the absence of coordination is a common cause of 
poor quality in health care delivery and has a significant effect on patient outcomes and 
costs (Ovretveit, 2011). Efforts to strengthen care coordination should therefore come 
under the broad umbrella of improving quality – in other words, care coordination is a 
tool rather than an end in itself. The same is true of disease management programmes; 
although achieving a significant rate of participation in Therapie Aktiv may indicate a 
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degree of policy success, participation rates are obviously not the ultimate outcome of 
interest. 
 
Second, participation in a DMP does not guarantee that a patient will receive the 
specified care or that their care will be more coordinated as a result. In France, for 
example, a scheme to encourage people with chronic conditions to adhere to a care 
protocol has been deemed a success because it has a high participation rate. However, 
policymakers are unable to determine whether patients actually follow the protocol. 
 
Third, our interviews with Austrian and German stakeholders suggest that the concept 
and language of „programmes‟ may undermine efforts to strengthen care coordination 
by polarising opinion, particularly among providers but also among patients. Providers 
may regard DMPs as a threat to professional autonomy, while patients may feel that 
participating in a programme limits their choice. Consequently, these groups may 
position themselves as being „for‟ or „against‟ DMPs. In contrast, it would be difficult 
to find people opposing concepts such as coordinated care or quality of care. 
 
 
7.2 Actions to strengthen care coordination policy 
 
1. Make management of chronic conditions the norm. In countries such as England 
and the Netherlands people with chronic conditions are not asked to enrol in a 
DMP. Rather, providers are encouraged to offer them recommended „best practice‟ 
as a matter of course – for example, eligible patients will routinely be invited to 
take part in smoking cessation programmes or attend information sessions and 
exercise classes. We therefore recommend that social health insurance abandon the 
current system of requiring physicians and patients to participate in a DMP and 
instead encourage all relevant providers to offer all relevant patients services 
identified in advance as best practice. This recommendation is supported by the 
finding that some Austrian physicians were put off from participating in DMPs due 
to having to read through what they perceived as being a lengthy contract. 
 
2. Financial incentives targeted at physicians should reward adherence to best 
practice. We recommend that social health insurance abandon the current system of 
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financially rewarding individual physicians who agree to participate in a DMP. 
Rather, the financial reward should be attached to evidence of a physician actually 
providing services identified in advance as best practice or reaching pre-determined 
quality targets. Austria can draw on international experience here. There are a 
growing number of health systems in which monitoring quality, providing feedback 
to physicians and linking payment to performance (Wambach & Lindenthal, 2009) 
is used to improve care quality for patients with chronic conditions. In England the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) introduced in 2004 rewards GPs for 
achieving better clinical outcomes and improving process and structural quality 
measured through 134 indicators.
6
 In France GPs are now paid more if they provide 
better care to patients as measured through 16 indicators related to process and 
intermediate outcome quality (CAPI, Contrat d‟amélioration des pratiques 
individuelles) (Aubert & Polton, 2009).
7
 The development of appropriate indicators 
for Austria would be guided by context-specific considerations. These might 
include acceptability among stakeholders and feasibility in terms of indicators that 
can be derived from routine data versus those that require additional investments 
(eg computerising primary care practices). 
 
3. Social health insurance should engage in regular dialogue with patients, 
providers and their representatives. This could take place in different ways, but 
the aim is to create a forum for discussion and agreement on best practice for 
patients with chronic conditions. In addition to identifying key elements of best 
practice, this sort of dialogue should be used to develop an understanding of best 
practice guidelines as decision support tools to improve quality and not as 
instruments of control. Events should be organised and led by experienced and 
                                                                    
6
 For more information see the accompanying Measurement Report. Examples of indicators include the 
proportion of diabetic patients receiving a regular eye exam, the percentage of people diagnosed with 
hypertension (diagnosed after 1 April 2009) who are given lifestyle advice in the preceding 15 months 
for increasing physical activity, smoking cessation, safe alcohol consumption and healthy diet, the 
percentage of patients with diabetes with a record of a foot examination and risk classification. The 
current risk classification system distinguishes between 1) low risk (normal sensation, palpable pulses), 
2) increased risk (neuropathy or absent pulses), 3) high risk (neuropathy or absent pulses plus deformity 
or skin changes in previous ulcer) or 4) ulcerated foot within the preceding 15 months . 
7
 Indicators relate to process quality (e.g. eye checks, HbA1c checks) for patients with diabetes; results-
based objective for treating high blood pressure (the target is to normalise blood pressure for 50% of the 
patients over three years), prevention (e.g. objective is to achieve 75% vaccination rate for over 65 years 
old patients), targets related to minimising prescribing of ineffective, addictive or harmful drugs (e.g. 
benzodiazepines) and optimising generic prescribing . 
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neutral facilitators and held at regular intervals. Recent examples include efforts to 
engage the public in Canada (Gauvin, 2012) and stakeholder engagement through 
health conferences in Germany (Brand & Michelsen, 2012). More generally, 
international experience on implementing Health in All Policies (McQueen et al., 
2012) provides insights into the importance of engagement beyond government in 
implementing complex policies in a context where multiple interests are at stake. 
These examples illustrate how Austrian social health insurance could move towards 
a more dialogue-based culture of communication with patients, providers and their 
representatives. 
 
Social health insurance, the insured and patients  
 
4. Find out how patients think their care could be improved. Social health 
insurance would benefit from asking people with chronic conditions if and how 
they feel the care they receive could be improved. This would help to identify 
potential problems and demonstrate to patients that their views are taken seriously. 
The annual LIVE statement could be used to survey patients, although it might 
result in selection bias. Another approach would be to conduct specific surveys to 
find out more about patients‟ views and needs. Examples of patient surveys can be 
found in the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK. An accompanying report gives 
examples of topic guides for measuring continuity of care, which could be adapted 
for use in Austria. 
 
5. Raise public awareness of the benefits of care coordination. Our interviews 
suggest social health insurance is currently perceived as being rather passive when 
it comes to care coordination. To address this, social health insurance could initiate 
a public awareness campaign in collaboration with patient associations. Working 
with patient associations might help to allay fears about social health insurance 
„interfering‟ in the doctor-patient-relationship. Generic communication strategies 
such as advertising, magazines and flyers are used in many European countries, 
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regardless of how the health system is financed and organised, and should be more 
frequently used in Austria. 
 
6. Align incentives to improve access to care. At present people with chronic 
conditions are asked to visit their physician more frequently. Some sickness funds 
still impose user charges for each visit, albeit with a reduced rate for those enrolled 
in a DMP. Because it does not make economic sense to create financial barriers to 
access to effective care, we recommend that exemptions from user charges for GP 
visits and prescription drugs are extended to anyone with a defined chronic 
condition (including people in sickness funds without user charges for physician 
visits). Many people with diabetes are already exempt from user charges, so the 
financial impact on social health insurance would be modest. Such a change would 
also enhance fairness by putting all those with defined chronic conditions on an 
equal footing. 
 
Social health insurance and providers 
 
7. Find out what challenges physicians face in caring for patients with chronic 
conditions. Our interviews suggest that not all doctors find it easy to provide 
appropriate care for patients with chronic conditions, while some doctors regard 
DMPs as instruments of control. We recommend that social health insurance works 
with patient associations to survey individual physicians and professional 
representatives. The survey should not focus on DMPs but ask broader questions 
about barriers to care coordination and the provision of good care. In the 
accompanying measurement report, we provide examples of topic guides for 
measuring care coordination from the health professional‟s perspective using 
qualitative methods. Such approaches could easily be adapted to the Austrian 
context. 
 
8. Engage opinion leaders. Experience from Austria and Germany suggests it is 
worth trying to identify and engage local opinion leaders who can support policies 
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to strengthen care coordination and positively influence their peers. To this end 
social health insurance could identify suitable physicians and work with them to 
spread knowledge, experience and an open-minded attitude among physicians about 
how to improve care coordination and quality. 
  
9. Strengthen clinical and organisational support for physicians. Our interviews 
suggest that physicians lack both clinical and organisational capacity to provide 
effective care for people with chronic conditions, especially when their disease has 
progressed. Professional and organisational issues could be addressed by 
establishing a peer system in which physicians experienced in (for example) 
diabetes care are available to advise other physicians on a confidential basis. 
Providing physicians with relevant IT tools and training would also help to improve 
office management (provided it is compatible with existing IT equipment). 
 
10. Improve patient training through centrally provided mobile units. The current 
system of patient training (delivered by individual physicians) does not seem to be 
effective. Not all doctors are equally willing or able to provide high quality training 
and yet some are unwilling to send their patients to other local physicians for fear of 
„losing‟ them to competitors. To address this, we recommend that social health 
insurance establish mobile patient training units that can offer group training 
sessions. The mobile units could be funded using resources currently spent on 
patient training and would therefore be cost neutral and potentially much more cost-
effective. 
 
11. Minimise the impact of veto points in the health system. The position of social 
health insurance is weakened by the need for collective consent from the Chamber 
of Physicians. Giving sickness funds the ability to establish selective contracts (ie 
with individual physicians or groups of physicians) that focus on improving care 
coordination would help to move things forward. The German experience suggests 
such an arrangement might be a powerful lever for change. 
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Social health insurance and sickness funds 
12. Establish financial incentives for quality (including care coordination). At 
present sickness funds have little incentive to be concerned about the quality of care 
delivery, which is highly problematic. The health care reform currently under 
discussion could address this by introducing quality objectives linked to financial 
incentives. The German experience suggests that DMPs were taken up by payers 
because their introduction was linked to strong financial incentives, emphasising 
the need to think of strategies to motivate payers to develop and implement care 
coordination initiatives. One option would be for the release of Federal funding to 
be made conditional on achieving targets, further developing the instrument of the 
“Kassenstrukturfonds”. 
 
13. Establish (genuine) financial incentives for coordination at care interfaces. 
Sickness funds and state governments have little incentive to address care 
coordination problems at the interface of inpatient and outpatient care. The 
Reformpool mechanism failed to address this because it did not provide genuinely 
additional funds – rather, funds were only available if savings were made. A 
proportion of Federal Health Agency funding (derived from social health insurance 
and the Federal government) could be withheld from general allocation and 
earmarked for care coordination projects. This would also help to address capacity 
problems at regional level. Projects would continue to be implemented on a 
decentralised basis but the Federal Health Commission could provide a national, 
evidence-based template for (for example) developing DMPs, which could then be 
adapted to fit regional contexts. 
 
14. Create a mechanism for rolling out successful projects. A mechanism is needed 
to transform successful pilot projects into routine care. This could build more 
strongly on central resources but give sub-national actors the opportunity to adapt 
projects to their regional context. A mechanism for knowledge exchange (such as a 
national website) would also mitigate rivalry between institutions. 
 
15. Foster transparency about care coordination initiatives. Experience suggests 
that without additional funding and legal requirements, those responsible for care 
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coordination initiatives are reluctant to conduct and publish evaluations. One way 
of addressing this is to make the evaluation of projects (genuinely) mandatory, 
based on defined quality criteria and standards for evaluation, and at the same time 
to provide earmarked funds for evaluation, perhaps through the Federal Health 
Agency. 
 
16. Foster transparency about health system performance. National and sub-
national benchmarking and analysis of current and „best‟ practice would help to 
move towards a system of outcome measurement in the Austrian health system. 
Promoting transparency about health system performance would also help to 
change perceptions about new forms of care resulting in more income for providers 
rather than better outcomes for patients. A specific measure would be to initiate 
research into regional variations in health service use and performance, which is 
currently undertaken in various countries (Right Care, 2012; Wennberg 
International Collaborative, 2012). To communicate this type of research evidence, 
many countries
8
 are developing „Atlases of Variation‟ which illustrate regional 
differences in care quality. Evidence of geographic variations in service delivery 
does not in itself identify whether and what changes in service design ought to be 
made (Tanenbaum, 2012). However, experience from England suggests that 
information on variation can help to drive the case for change by increasing the 
visibility of potential care deficits, encouraging positive „reputation effects‟ by 
stimulating improvement among poor performers and especially by creating 
problem awareness and a common basis for discussion among stakeholders (Schang 
et al., forthcoming) (for more information see the accompanying Measurement 
Report).  
 
 
                                                                    
8
 Atlases of Health Care Variation have been developed in England on behalf of the Department of 
Health , in the U.S. by a research institute , in Germany by an independent foundation  and by the 
scientific institute of SHI physicians‟ associations , in Spain by a partnership of academic and 
governmental institutions , and in the Netherlands on behalf of the Dutch health insurers„ association . 
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7.3 Broader recommendations  
As we highlighted in section 4.1, attempts to strengthen care coordination and improve 
quality will have to address a range of weaknesses in the Austrian health system, 
particularly in the organisation and delivery of primary care. A recent international 
comparative cross-sectional study performed in 31 European countries suggests that the 
Austrian primary care system scores weakly overall, and is particularly weak with 
regard to primary care workforce development, continuity of care, care coordination 
and comprehensiveness of care (Kringos et al., 2012). Here we focus on six issues that 
relate to the financing, structure, organisation and governance of the Austrian health 
system as a whole. In our view it is essential to address these issues if Austria is to 
make progress in strengthening care coordination for people with chronic conditions. 
 
1. Finance health care from a single source  
The lack of shared financial responsibility for ambulatory, hospital and long-term care
9
 
has three potentially detrimental effects. First, patients are in danger of being referred 
between sectors simply so that payers can shift costs to other sectors. As a result, health 
care is often not delivered in the most clinically beneficial or cost-effective location 
(Czypionka et al., 2009). Second, this fragmentation in financing lowers payers‟ 
willingness to invest in cross-sectoral coordination, as any benefits might accrue 
elsewhere. Third, it exacerbates ambulatory-inpatient care interface problems. 
To overcome these problems we suggest that all health services should be financed 
from a single source and funds should follow the patient. This change in financial flows 
would help to ensure that any care provided is patient-oriented (ie suited to the patient‟s 
needs) and cost effective. It would also encourage transparency. However, such a 
change requires a sustainable financial agreement. The 15a agreement has been shown 
to be ineffective because negotiations that take place every five years undermine the 
sort of long-term thinking that is required (Czypionka et al., 2009). 
 
 
                                                                    
9 Hospitals are paid by provincial health funds financed by government (all levels), while SHI and office-
based physicians are paid by SHI. 
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2. Invest in the training of general practitioners  
Austria's weak system of primary care has its roots in the training of GPs, which 
comprises only three years, with most of the time spent in hospitals. This does not 
prepare physicians for their real field of work as GPs providing comprehensive primary 
care services. Lack of capability may result in frequent referrals, undermining 
continuity of care for the patient. Without stronger investment in primary care, policies 
to strengthen care coordination are unlikely to have significant and lasting effects. 
Changes to the training programme for GPs will therefore have to be made. Any 
changes should strengthen the emphasis on family medicine. It will also be important to 
tighten the framework for continuing professional development (CPD), which should 
be made compulsory in Austria. It is increasingly common for European countries to 
make CPD compulsory and even a prerequisite for recertification (Czypionka et al., 
2006a). 
 
3. Promote group practices and skill-mix in primary care 
International experience suggests it may be difficult for doctors working in solo or 
small practices to provide well-coordinated care for people with chronic conditions. In 
England, for example, performance improvements related to the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) have been directly linked to practice ability to organise care (Wang 
et al., 2006). Research shows that the size and composition of a practice‟s clinical team 
have been the most important determinants of achieving a high quality score under the 
QOF, confirming previous research demonstrating better quality of care for some 
chronic conditions in larger practices in England (although smaller practices may 
provide better access to care) (Campbell et al., 2001; Sutton & McLean, 2006). 
Practices with fewer than four full-time equivalent clinicians (GPs and practice nurses) 
recorded lower QOF scores (Sutton & McLean, 2006). 
This evidence lends support to the promotion of larger clinical teams and greater 
diversity in primary care practice. Group practice is not a magic bullet, but it is likely to 
be a step towards improving care coordination if it enables physicians to pool resources 
to employ assistants and specialist nurses for people with chronic conditions. Social 
health insurance could encourage this by providing incentives for the delegation of 
administrative and routine medical tasks (eg blood glucose measurement). Considerable 
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legal restrictions on group practice constitute another barrier to a more diverse primary 
care system in Austria. Achieving the full potential of group practices would therefore 
involve legal changes as well as financial incentives to promote a better skill-mix, 
including opportunities for practices to employ salaried doctors, to involve more than 
eight doctors and to involve hospitals. 
Changing the way in which providers are paid, so that additional remuneration for 
improved co-ordination compensates for any loss of income due to sharing of tasks 
with other professionals, may be necessary. However, policy makers should not assume 
that doctors will co-operate with other providers simply because they are paid extra to 
do so. A complementary but longer-term approach to overcoming professional 
resistance may be to emphasise the benefits of multidisciplinary working for patients 
and for providers, particularly during the early stages of professional training. 
 
4. Coordinate patient access to health care and across care levels 
Patients in Austria have direct access to generalist and specialist outpatient physicians. 
Poorly coordinated patient access to the health system, combined with the absence of 
good information flows between providers, is not only potentially harmful to patients 
but also costly to the health system as a whole. Countries with strong primary care 
systems, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Kringos et al., 2012), regard 
GP gatekeeping as a response to this problem. However, as with group practice, 
gatekeeping by itself will not resolve coordination problems because it does not 
automatically improve communication between providers. Having said that, it seems 
advisable to promote the idea of a regular point of care for patients. Some integrated 
care networks in Germany have introduced a “care doctor” (Betreuungsarzt) who might 
be any doctor, including a specialist, and who takes on the task of coordinating patient 
care over time and across providers. 
 
5. Promote electronic health information systems and information exchange 
The availability and appropriate use of electronic health information systems have a 
large role to play in improving care co-ordination within practices, among providers 
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and between sectors. Austria would benefit from fostering more effective 
communication between providers and between providers and patients. Some form of 
health record (for example, the planned electronic health record ELGA and 
ePrescription) should be introduced alongside efforts to help physicians (the regular 
doctor suggested above) to make good use of patient data (Pechar, 2012). However, 
acceptance of ELGA and ePrescription remains unclear. 
 
6. Develop a culture of excellence and best practice 
Better care coordination can be supported through the provision of best-practice clinical 
guidelines. Most European Union countries have an established national, regional or 
local clinical guideline programme, and many have developed guidelines for the 
prevention and management of chronic conditions (Legido-Quigley et al., 2012). The 
extent of adherence to guidelines among physicians has not been evaluated in Austria 
and quality monitoring and assessment of office-based physicians remain 
underdeveloped (Czypionka et al., 2006a). The interviews highlighted scepticism 
among providers towards evidence-based practice and concerns about public disclosure 
of performance data. This suggests it is worthwhile doing more to involve physicians 
(and perhaps also patient groups) in the development of best-practice guidelines and 
quality standards, so that there is greater understanding of the benefits of an evidence-
based approach to clinical practice. These benefits include lower transaction costs for 
individual physicians, support for professional judgement and better quality of care for 
patients. 
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Appendix: Interview guides 
 
Auf dem Weg zu einer besseren Koordination der Versorgung für Menschen mit 
chronischen Krankheiten:  
Eine Analyse von Bestrebungen in Österreich  
 
 
Ein Projekt der London School of Economics und des Instituts für Höhere Studien im 
Auftrag des Hauptverbands der österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger 
 
 
 
Projekthintergrund 
 
Angesichts des demographischen Wandels sowie steigender Prävalenz chronischer 
Krankheiten stellt eine qualitativ hochwertige Versorgung chronisch kranker Menschen 
eine wachsende Herausforderung für das österreichische Gesundheitssystem dar.  
 
Wir würden Ihnen gerne einige Fragen stellen zu Ihren Ansichten zu den 
wahrscheinlichen Effekten stärker koordinierter Versorgung, Ihrer Einschätzung 
aktueller politischer Maßnahmen, und Ihrer Einbindung in den Reformprozess vor und 
nach 2005.  
 
Mit Ihrer Erlaubnis würden wir das Interview gerne aufnehmen. Ihre Antworten bleiben 
vertraulich und werden nicht auf Sie persönlich bezogen.  
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Fragen an Akteure im Reformprozess 
 
 
 
Name:       Datum: 
 
Position:      Time: 
 
Organisation: 
 
 
 
A. Ansichten zu koordinierter Versorgung in Österreich: 
Verbesserungsbemühungen zum Status Quo 
 
1. Was ist Ihrer Ansicht nach der Sinn und Zweck, die Gesundheitsversorgung für 
Menschen mit chronischen Krankheiten besser zu koordinieren? 
 
2. Welchen Einfluss, glauben Sie, hat eine bessere Versorgungskoordination auf: 
a) Patienten 
b) Leistungserbringer 
c) Kostenträger, z.B. Krankenkassen, Länder  
d) Das Gesundheitssystem insgesamt 
 
3. Wo sehen Sie die gröβten Herausforderungen, eine bessere 
Versorgungskoordination zu erreichen? 
 
 
 
B. Ansichten zum österreichischen Gesundheitssystem 
 
4. Besteht ein Bedarf nach mehr (oder besserer) Versorgungskoordination in 
Österreich? Warum? Warum nicht?  
 
5. Wo sehen Sie aktuellen Stärken und Schwächen des österreichischen 
Gesundheitssystems hinsichtlich der folgenden Aspekte, die für eine besser 
koordinierte Versorgung wichtig sein könnten? (Anmerkung: Fragen dienen als 
Gedankenstütze/ später evtl. als „grid for analysis“zur Problemdiagnose und 
können auf den jeweiligen Interviewpartner angepasst werden) 
 
a) „Kultur der Evaluation“  
i. Qualitätsmonitoring und –messung (Prozessqualität und 
Ergebnisqualität) 
ii. Informationssysteme auch mit Auswertung der Performance ((i) auf 
Praxis-/ Krankenhausebene; (ii) verschiedene Leistungserbringer/ – 
sektoren vernetzend) 
iii. Rolle der evidenz-basierten Medizin bzw. medizinischer Leitlinien 
 
 
b) Steuerung des Gesundheitswesens  
  
 80 
i. System der „Gemeinsamen Selbstverwaltung“ 
ii. Koordination mit den Ländern  
 
c) Sektorale Gliederung  
i. .. der Bedarfsplanung:  
1. im ambulanten Sektor  
2. im stationären Sektor  
ii. .. der Finanzierung:  
1. Ambulant  
2. Stationär  
3. Pflege 
 
 
d) Organisation der Finanzierung  
i. Rolle des Wettbewerbs in der GKV 
ii. Finanzierung niedergelassener Ärzte 
iii. Finanzierung der Krankenhäuser 
 
e) Organisation der Leistungserbringung 
i. Rolle des Hausarztes  
ii. Rolle des niedergelassenen Facharztes 
iii. Verfügbarkeit von medizinischen Leistungen (z.B. freier Zugang zum 
Facharzt) 
 
  
C. Ansichten zu aktuellen Initiativen, die Versorgungskoordination zu verbessern  
 
6. Wo sehen Sie die gröβten Stärken und Schwächen der folgenden Initiativen 
a) Disease Management Programme;  
b) Reformpool und verwandte Projekte; 
c) Integrierte Versorgungsplanung  
d) Hausarztzentrierte Versorgung 
 
7. Wie könnten Stakeholder zu einer besseren Versorgungskoordination motiviert 
werden? 
 
8. Welche zusätzlichen Maßnahmen könnten die genannten Initiativen und 
Versorgungskoordination insgesamt verbessern? 
 
 
 
D. Einbindung und Position im Reformprozess  
 
9. Wie waren Sie oder Ihre Organisation involviert in den verschiedenen Phasen des 
Reformprozesses, um die Versorgungskoordination zu verbessern? (z.B. 
Gesundheitsreform 2005, aber auch 15a-VB und operative Maßnahmen wie z.B. 
ÖSG/ Regionale Strukturplanung Gesundheit) 
  
 81 
a) Identifizierung von Problem: Die Anfangsphase, in der Informationen 
gesammelt und Probleme in der Leistungserbringung identifiziert 
wurden  
b) Reform Design: Die Phase, in der mögliche Handlungsoptionen und 
identifiziert und diskutiert wurden  
c) Gesetzgebung: Die Phase, in der politische Maßnahmen oder neü 
Handlungsoptionen für Akteure im Gesundheitswesen gesetzlich 
verankert wurden 
d) Umsetzung: Die Phase, in der Maßnahmen zur Versorgungskoordination 
auf der Ebene individueller Patienten und Leistungserbringer umgesetzt 
wurden 
 
10. Wo sehen Sie die Erfolgsfaktoren und Hindernisse in jeder dieser Reformphasen? 
 
11. Haben Sie oder Ihre Organisation eine formelle Position (z.B. befürwortend, 
neutral, kritisch) im Laufe dieser Phasen eingenommen?  
 
12. Hat sich die Position ihrer Organisation im Laufe des Reformprozesses verändert? 
Warum oder warum nicht?  
 
 
E. Weiteres 
 
13. Können Sie uns weitere wichtige Literaturquellen zum Thema empfehlen? 
 
14. Möchten Sie weitere Interviewpartner empfehlen, die wir kontaktieren sollten?  
 
15. Möchten Sie sonst etwas hinzufügen?  
 
 
Vielen herzlichen Dank für Ihre Mühe. 
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Auf dem Weg zu einer besseren Koordination der Versorgung für Menschen mit 
chronischen Krankheiten:  
Eine Analyse von Bestrebungen in Deutschland  
 
 
Ein Projekt der London School of Economics und des Instituts für Höhere Studien im 
Auftrag des Hauptverbands der österreichischen Sozialversicherungsträger 
 
 
 
Projekthintergrund 
 
Angesichts des demographischen Wandels sowie steigender Prävalenz chronischer 
Krankheiten stellt eine qualitativ hochwertige Versorgung chronisch kranker Menschen 
eine wachsende Herausforderung für das deutsche Gesundheitssystem dar.  
 
Wir würden Ihnen gerne einige Fragen stellen zu Ihrer Einbindung in den 
Reformprozess, Ihrer Einschätzung aktueller politischer Maβnahmen sowie zu 
Aspekten des deutschen Gesundheitssystems.  
 
Mit Ihrer Erlaubnis würden wir das Interview gerne aufnehmen. Ihre Antworten bleiben 
vertraulich und werden nicht auf Sie persönlich bezogen.  
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Fragen an Akteure im Reformprozess 
 
 
Name:       Datum: 
 
Position:      Time: 
 
Organisation: 
 
 
A. Einbindung und Position im Reformprozess  
 
1. Wie waren Sie oder Ihre Organisation involviert in den verschiedenen Phasen des 
Reformprozesses (i) vor und nach 2000/2004 (bezüglich der Möglichkeit zur 
integrierten Versorgung); (ii) vor und nach 2002 (bezüglich der Möglichkeit zu 
DMPs), UND/ODER (iii) vor und nach 2009 (bezüglich der Verpflichtung zur 
Hausarztzentrierten Versorgung), um die Versorgungskoordination zu verbessern?  
a) Identifizierung von Problem: Die Anfangsphase, in der Problem in der 
Leistungserbringung identifiziert wurden 
b) Reform Design: Die Phase, in der mögliche Handlungsoptionen 
identifiziert und diskutiert wurden  
c) Gesetzgebung: Die Phase, in der politische Maβnahmen oder neue 
Handlungsoptionen für Akteure im Gesundheitswesen gesetzlich 
verankert wurden 
d) Umsetzung: Die Phase, in der Maβnahmen zur Versorgungskoordination 
auf der Ebene individueller Patienten und Leistungserbringer umgesetzt 
wurden 
 
2. Wo sehen Sie die Erfolgsfaktoren und Hindernisse in jeder dieser Reformphasen? 
 
3. Haben Sie oder Ihre Organisation eine formelle Position (z.B. befürwortend, 
neutral, kritisch) in jeder dieser Phasen eingenommen?  
 
4. Hat sich die Position ihrer Organisation im Laufe des Reformprozesses verändert? 
Warum oder warum nicht?  
 
 
 
B. Ansichten zu aktuellen Initiativen, die Versorgungskoordination zu verbessern  
 
5. Welche positiven und negativen Effekte hatten die folgenden Instrumente des SGB 
V auf die Koordination der Versorgung chronisch kranker Menschen?  
(Anmerkung: v.a. chronisch Kranke aber eventuell auch andere Erkrankungen mit 
multiprofessionellem Behandlungsbedarf) 
 
a) DMPs (§ 137) 
b) Integrierte Versorgung (§140) 
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c) Hausarztzentrierte Versorgung (§73b SGB) 
d) Strukturverträge (§73 a) 
e) Spezielle fachärztliche Versorgung (§73c) 
f) Medizinische Versorgungszentren (§ 95) 
 
6. Welche Faktoren haben dazu beigetragen, die Versorgungskoordination durch diese 
Instrumente zu verbessern?  
a) Wie werden Patienten & Arzte zur Teilnahme motiviert? 
 
7. Welche Herausforderungen bleiben bestehen?  
 
8. Wie könnten diese Herausforderungen angegangen werden? 
 
 
 
C. Ansichten zum deutschen Gesundheitssystem  
 
9. Wo sehen Sie aktuellen Stärken und Schwächen des deutschen Gesundheitssystems 
hinsichtlich der folgenden Aspekte, die für eine besser koordinierte Versorgung 
wichtig sein könnten?  
 
a) „Kultur der Evaluation“  
i. Qualitätsmonitoring und –messung (Prozessqualität und 
Ergebnisqualität) 
ii. Informationssysteme auch mit Auswertung der Performance ((i) auf 
Praxis-/ Krankenhausebene; (ii) verschiedene Leistungserbringer/ – 
sektoren vernetzend) 
iii. Rolle der evidenz-basierten Medizin bzw. medizinischer Leitlinien 
 
b) Steuerung des Gesundheitswesens  
i. System der Gemeinsamen Selbstverwaltung 
ii. Koordination mit den Ländern (Österreich) 
 
c) Sektorale Gliederung  
i. .. der Bedarfsplanung:  
1. Zulassungsausschüsse im ambulanten Sektor  
2. Landes-Krankenhausplan im stationären Sektor  
ii. .. der Finanzierung:  
1. Ambulant => KV 
2. Stationär => GKV/DKG, duale Finanzierung (Länder: 
investitionen, GKV: laufende) 
3. Pflege => Pflegeversicherung 
4. Rehabilitation => GKV oder Rentenversicherung 
5. Arbeitsunfälle => Berufsgenossenschaften u. 
Unfallkassen des Bundes und der Länder 
 
 
d) Organisation der Finanzierung  
i. Rolle des Wettbewerbs in der GKV 
ii. Finanzierung niedergelassener Ärzte 
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iii. Finanzierung der Krankenhäuser 
 
e) Organisation der Leistungserbringung 
i. Rolle des Hausarztes (Mögliche Modelle z.B.: (i) „Einzelkämpfer“, der 
wenig auf medizinische Leitlinien und Kommunikation mit anderen 
Leistungserbringern setzt; (ii) „populations-orientierter Fallmanager“, 
der seine Patienten kennt, angemessen häufig untersucht und 
behandelt, und sie beim Management ihrer Krankheiten unterstützt (iii) 
„Lotse“, der Übergänge zu anderen Leistungserbringern/-sektoren 
koordiniert; (iv) „Gatekeeper“, der Zugang zu fachärztlicher 
Versorgung kontrolliert) 
ii. Rolle des niedergelassenen Facharztes 
iii. Verfügbarkeit von medizinischen Leistungen (z.B. freier Zugang zum 
Facharzt) 
 
 
D. Weiteres 
 
10. Können Sie uns weitere wichtige Literaturquellen zum Thema empfehlen? 
 
 
11. Möchten Sie sonst etwas hinzufügen?  
 
 
12. Möchten Sie weitere Interviewpartner empfehlen, die wir kontaktieren sollten?  
 
 
Vielen herzlichen Dank für Ihre Mühe. 
 
